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INTRODUCTION

Recently it has been recognized that the United
States federal government is no longer limiting its func
tions to the mere protection of the so-called inalienable

rights of the people.

The Great Depression prior to the

Second World War; the inadequacy of the economic theory of

the invisible hand as a remedy for economic woes; the increas
ing population coupled with scarcity of resources to meet
human needs; the vivid inequalities among nations of the

world and among the people of the same nation; the high

degree of interdependence among nations of the globe; the

energy crisis; and air pollution have all placed the federal
government in a difficult position.
With such perplexing and intricate problems, there
has been a growing tendency on the part of individuals and
business firms to rely on the government and ask for its
aid.

Both individuals and business firms turn to the

government for help; and, ironically, when the government
steps in to offer such assistance, the same individuals and
business firms complain about over-regulation, loss of

individual liberty, and other injustices on the part of the

government.

The paradox is clear—the demand for public

service on the one nand and the aversion of many towards
1

govGrniusnt on th© otheir.

Nevertheless, the fact remains;

the federal government can no longer afford to be a

bystander, but rather must be an active participant in
solving these problems.

As an active participant, the

government is not only solving the problems but, in some
cases, is taking the initiative and functioning as a change

agent.

The federal government is thereby bringing about

political, economical, and social changes throughout the
nation and the world, as well, with the objective of either

reducing the adverse effects of the problems or eliminating
their causes.

Whether the federal government issues a web of laws

or regulations, creates new agencies, dismantles others,

reorganizes its structure, or conducts certain programs to
meet the people's needs and help solve problems, there is

always cost attached to- any of its activities.

It is quite

logical to assume that the more the federal government

expands its role, the more the costs of carrying out its
activities year after year will increase.

This has acti

vated the concern of many regarding the efficiency and

effectiveness of government performance, in addition to the
traditional concern with controlling the government costs.

Accounting information on costs and benefits of government
activities has not always been available.

Measures of

efficiency and effectiveness of government programs have

always posed problems for scholars and practitioners.

Meanwhile, there have been highly sophisticated and

successful managerial and accounting methods and designs in

the private sector yielding valuable information of substan
tial help in decision making and evaluation of performance
in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

The comparison

between the two sectors has led many intellectuals and

practitioners to feel the inadequacy of the accounting
methods and systems in the federal government, and conse

quently, have made these groups concerned with the inadequate
quality and the low reliability of the information derived.
These groups argue that now is the time for the federal

government to change its accounting reports and methods to
become more business-like.

Specifically, they call for the

application of the accrual method of accounting in govern
ment.

These groups see this as a major step towards having

meaningful information on government activities,.

They also

maintain that accrual accounting can serve as a valuable
tool in the decision-making process.

Additionally, these

groups view the accrual .method of accounting as a must in
order to be able to utilize accounting information to its
maximum potential.

It is in regard to this issue of the accrual method
of accounting in the federal government that the thrust of
this inquiry was focused.

The main objective was to analyze the pros and cons
of this issue, unveil the arguments for and against it.

and explore its difficulties.

The assumptions on which the thesis was predicated
are simple and clear:

1.

The federal government is the largest and most

complex organization in the United States.

In terms of

structure, goals, manpower, or financial resources, there
is no other single organization that equals the federal
government.

2.

In

viewing the federal government from any

angle, politics and political considerations are pivotal
and tend to be at the heart of any issue.

It is unrealistic

to speak of the government strictly on an apolitical
basis.

3.

There are and there always will be differences

between the private and public organizations in several

respects.

For example, the basic goal of private organi

zations is profit through the sale of goods and services;
but public organizations have political and moral goals to
achieve.

Furthermore, the goal of the private organizations

can be easily determined and measured.

Public organizations'

goals in regard to responsiveness to social needs are
volatile and difficult to measure.

The market place tends

to impact the decision-making process in private organi
zations while national and international politics tend to

impact the decision-making process in public organizations.
4.

Systems and methods cannot be evaluated on their

own merits.

Systems and methods ought to be evaluated

within an organizational context.

In other words, they

should be evaluated in terras of their compatibility and

usefulness to organizational goals and environment.
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
The first chapter is a discussion of the nature of

the accounting discipline, the accounting methods, and
accounting as an information system.

The second chapter is descriptive in nature and is
a survey of the federal budget and accounting systems and
methods.

Chapters three, four, and five deal with the accrual

method in government.

The third chapter is a historical

account of the accrual method of accounting in the federal

government.

The fourth chapter is an analysis and a dis

cussion of the problems in adopting the accrual method of

accounting.

The fifth chapter is an analysis of the pros

and cons regarding the application of the accrual method in
the federal government.

The last chapter summarizes and provides for some
conclusions on the issue.

It is also important to mention that discussion and
analysis were limited to the activities of the federal gov
ernment, which are accounted for in the general fund.

Other

activities accounted for in separate funds were excluded.
Specifically, intragovernmental service, enterprise, and

trust funds were not included.

The reasons for this were,

firstly, that the first two types of funds are designed to
account for certain activities on a commercial basis and

are operated on a business-like orientation.

The truth is

that they do not raise any technical, not to say political,
problems concerning the accrual method of accounting.
Secondly, trust funds are established to account for
certain revenues which are earmarked for specific govern
mental programs.

Social Security and Highway trust funds

are examples of these types of funds.

Receipts and expendi

tures from these trust funds are probably the least

controllable as compared with other funds.

Administration

of such funds is a question that goes beyond accrual account

ing.

Also, within trust funds there may exist "trust

revolving funds" which account for business-type operations
and, as such, should not raise technical problems regarding
the accrual method of accounting.

Thirdly, general fund activities account for a sub
stantial portion of the federal budget in terms of both
receipts and outlays (see Appendix A).

Fourthly, the nature of the general fund activities
poses certain problems regarding their susceptibility to the
accrual method.

For the purpose of this thesis, the terms "public
organizations," "government," and "federal government" were
used interchangeably to mean, unless otherwise stated, the

executive branch of government (i.e., the federal agencies)
Throughout the paper it was necessary to make com

parisons between the private and the public organizations
whenever it seemed appropriate and relevant.

CHAPTER I

ACCOUNTING AS AN INFORMATION SYSTEM

Professor A. C. Pigou wrote:

When a man sets out upon any course of inquiry,
the object of his search may be either light or
fruit-bearing, either knowledge for its own sake
or knowledge for the sake of good things to which
it leads.

In various fields of study these two .

ideals play parts of varying importance. In the
appeal made to our interest by nearly all the
great modern sciences some stress is laid both upon
the light-bearing and upon the fruit-bearing quality,
but the proportions of the blend are different in
different sciences.^
While Professor Pigou maintained this bright dis

tinction among various sciences on the basis of the object
of man's search, there are other distinctions that can be

drawn and which were also recognized explicitly or implicitly
by Professor Pigou.

One of these other distinctions is that

which is based on the subject matter.

According to this dis

tinction and quoting Spencer:
A science is a branch of study concerned with
establishing and systematizing facts, principles,
and methods.

The social sciences are those branches

of study dealing in a scientific way with human
beings in their many relationships with one another.
They are to be contrasted with the natural sciences,

such as physics, biology, and astronomy, which study
the structures and processes of organisms and other

^A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed.
(London:

MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 3.

physical phenomena.

There are a number of differ

ent social sciences, but they all overlap to some

extent. Any boundary between them is very hazy,
for scholars are free to study whatever interests

them.^
History, economics, political science, management, and psy

chology generally fall under social sciences.

Chemistry,

physics and biology come rightfully under natural sciences.
There is, more or less, a common agreement among

several writers that scientific inquiry in natural sciences
is far more amenable to experimentation, quantification,
preciseness, and universality than in social sciences.

Such

laws as Newton's law of gravitation and Boyle's law of the
inverse relationship between the gas volume and pressure are

quantitative and generic.

In social sciences, it is quite

difficult to attain such a status.

complex creature.

First, man himself is a

Second, the complexity, multiplicity and

interdependence of variables in the social arena cloud any
conclusion about cause-effect relationships.

Third, experi

ments are rejected occasionally on religious, ethical, or
legal grounds; and when conducted, the results are cautiously
concluded and may apply only to a specific situation.
Finally, there is room for bias which, no matter how con
trolled, has an impact on the results obtained.

When we speak of natural science laws with a sense
of certainty, we can speak of social science laws only with

^Metta Spencer, Foundation of Modern Sociology
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
p. 2.

Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976),
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a degree of confidence.

For example, we can say that money

may motivate people at work.

The word "may" is used because

we are not certain whether money is always going to motivate

people or not, and because there are other variables that
come into play and which should be considered.

Regarding

social science results, Simon maintained that "the results

are statistical, rather than of an all-or-nothing kind; . . .
the results of a social-science study seldom are so clear

cut."^
In spite of these difficulties, social scientists
have achieved remarkable progress in their fields of economics,
politics, behavior, etc.

Their mission in developing a

systematic body of knowledge is more difficult than that of
natural scientists, yet their achievements cannot be down

played.

In addition to their attempts to adhere to the steps

of scientific inquiry, they have also devised their own
methods which are valid and reliable; hence, they are scien
4

tific.

The historical method, the case method, the

comparative and cross-cultural methods, and the inter
disciplinary method reflect the endeavors, talents, and

^Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social
Science: The Art of Empirical Investigation (New York:
Random House, 1969), p. 474.

^The traditional components of the scientific method
comprise observation, collection and classification of data,
formulation of hypothesis, testing and verification, and
finally generalization. In natural sciences such generali
zations tend to be in the form of quantitative laws.

11

innovations of social scientists in a complex and changing
world.

The question now is where does accounting fit in
this discussion?

The various definitions offered

to account

ing concentrate on the concern of the accounting discipline
with the measurement of human economic activities, recording,

summarizing, analyzing, and communicating pertinent informa
tion to interested parties.

It can be concluded that

accounting is a light-bearing and a fruit-bearing course of
inquiry on the one hand, and that it falls under the category
of social sciences on the other.

The reason for this categorization is, firstly,
accounting information throws light on the results of opera
tions of an organization and its financial position; and,
therefore, this information is valuable in itself and sought
for its own sake.

Secondly, there is the promise that sucn information

will lead to good things (i.e., sound economic decisions in
the areas of planning, control, and evaluation).

Such

decisions are the fruits of accounting information.
Finally, since accounting information is an identi
fication and a measurement of economic human activities,

generally within an organizational context, accounting

rightfully comes under the social sciences category.
In the course of its evolution from its primitive
form to its present sophisticated form, accounting has

12

always been a valuable source of information.

Further,

several subfields have emerged as a response to the com

plexity, diversification, and specialization of human social
and economic organizations.

Not only do we have financial

accounting but we also have cost accounting, managerial

accounting, tax accounting, non-profit organization

accounting, government accounting, and auditing.

Recently,

two more subfields have emerged: social accounting and inter
national accounting.
The basic theme in all these subfields is the finan

cial and economic information measured in monetary terms.

No wonder accounting stands at the heart of any quantitative

information system within an organization, be it private or
public.

This information is used by managers and adminis
trators for decision making within the organization.

Owners

and other outside groups interested in the organization rely
on the information to make such decisions that best suit them.

As Professor Horngren stated:

The accounting system is the major quantitative
information system in almost every organization. It
should provide information for three broad purposes:
1. Internal reporting to managers, for use in
planning and controlling routine operations.
2. Internal reporting to managers for use in
making non-routine decisions and in formulating
major plans and policies.
3. External reporting to stock-holders, govern
ment and other outside parties.

^Charles T. Horngren, Cost Accounting, A Managerial
Emphasis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 3-4.

Prentice-
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The accounting information is also vital at the
federal level.

According to the United States General

Accounting Office:
Accounting in the federal government should serve
two broad purposes.
First, it should provide data useful to agency

management officials in carrying out their responsi
bilities efficiently and economically.
Second, it should provide information that can
be reported to the Congress, the President, the
central financial agencies and the public on the
sources and

uses of the financial resources made

available to the federal agencies.
On the basis of historical costs and the statements

reflecting the results of operations, managers are able to

plan and budget for future operations.

The budget, pre

sumably a plan expressed in financial terms, is also a means
to control the activities and direct them towards achieving
the organizational goals.

This control function of the

budget is made possible through the periodic evaluation of

performance and comparison of the actual results (i.e.,
expenses and revenues with standards such as budgeted amounts

of expenses and revenues).

When tnere is a variance, managers

become aware that there is a problem and that a decision has
to be made.

The problem may be in the standard itself.

For

example, it may be too high or too low and, therefore, it
needs to be revised.

The problem, however, may be in the

actual performance of the employees; and, again, a decision

^U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government

(Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1970), jT! TT
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has to be made in this regard.

The decision may be to

motivate the employees toward a better performance and,

subsequently, to achieve organizational goals.
Davidson and Trueblood maintained that:

The tie between the accounting process and the
decision making process . . . is basically one of
information.

In its broadest and most fruitful

sense, accounting is an information or dataproviding function;. . . one of the uses of a
favorable or unfavorable variance generated by a
standard cost system is simply to tell management
that it has a problem. . . . The standard cost
system is an information device to indicate when
there is a problem.
Gibson, on the same line of argument, maintained
that management uses accounting data as a means of recog

nizing the need for a decision and for comparing alternative
courses of action.

The financial analysis on the impact of

each alternative is the means by which accounting information
can aid management in selecting the best possible one.

Pricing the inventory and selecting the depreciation method
are but examples of alternative courses of action made
8

available to management.

The truth is that accounting has been shifting from
its "throwing-light" role exemplified in the historical
orientation with emphasis on past events, towards a "fruit
bearing" role demonstrated in a future orientation where this

'^J. Justin Davidson and Robert M. Trueblood, "Account

in^ for Decision Making," Accounting Review 36 (October 1961)
°James L. Gibson, "Accounting in the Decision Making
Process: Some Empirical Evidence," Accounting Review 38
(July 1963):492-500.
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information is used in aiding the decision-making process
which, by its very nature, is future oriented.

Naturally, there has to be an accounting system
within the frame of which data are input, processed and out

putted in the form of meaningful, intelligible information.
This includes the existence of records, documents, books,

procedures, and methods for recording, summarizing and
classifying the data and producing the financial reports.
An accounting system has to have some basic characteristics.
First, it has to be capable of producing the information that
is required by management on a routine basis for routine
decision making and it has to be flexible enough to produce
information for non-routine decisions.

tion has to be timely.

Secondly, the informa

Late information is similar to no

information at all because there is little value in it.

Thirdly, the system has to convey an element of internal
control and be economic.

Finally, the system has to be

relevant to the organizational goals, compatible with
employees' abilities to implement it and integrated as a
component of a management information system.

An important point related to the accounting system
is the method of recording the transactions.

The signifi

cance of the accounting method of recording stems from the
fact that each method tends to yield a different result.

In

other words, each method has a different scope of information,
Basically, there are four methods.

They are as follows:
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1.

The aoarual method, whereby revenues and expenses

are recorded at the point of realization regardless of
whether cash is received or expended.

This method is widely

used by private sector organizations as it helps them achieve
their objective of determining profits, and matching revenues
and expenses.

2.

The cash method, whereby revenues and expenses

are recorded when cash is received or expended, respectively,
and not at the point of realization.

This method does not

reflect the true revenues or expenses for an accounting

period, nor does it match revenues with expenses.

This

method is generally used by nonprofit organizations and
several governmental units.

3.

The modified accrual method, whereby revenues

are recorded v/hen cash is received, except for material and/
or available revenue that should be recorded when taxes are

levied.

Expenditures (other than accrued interest on gen

eral long-term debt) are recorded at the time liabilities
are incurred regardless of whether cash is expended.

This

method is also used by several governmental entities at
the State and local levels and other nonprofit organizations.

4.

The obligations method, whereby federal agencies

are required to record the amounts of orders placed on con
tracts awarded and which will require payment when these
orders and contracts are fulfilled.

When these amounts are

recorded, they represent obligations against the spending

17

authority of an agency.

This method establishes a strong

point of control because federal agencies are required not
to spend more than what has been authorized by Congress.
Thus, this method, in essence, is a tracking system of how

much spending authority is available to spend, how much is
used (obligated), and how much is left.

At this point, the

obligations incurred method in the federal agencies is
similar to the encumbrance method as used in the State and

local governments.

Both methods have a part or all of the

spending authority being committed or obligated.
However, the Office of Management and Budget has

always expanded the meaning of obligations incurred to mean
not only commitment, but also to encompass liabilities.

In

Section 22.1 of Circular A-34, "services received" are

included as obligations incurred; and in Section 25.1,
"amounts earned by employees and others during the reporting
period" are also included.

This tends to confuse the concept

of obligations incurred, with the concept of accrued expendi
tures.

The latter is defined in the same circular under

Section 21.1 to mean "charges to an account during a given
period that reflect liabilities incurred and the need to pay
for services performed by employees, contractors . . . goods
9

and other tangible property received."

Organizations are different in terms of goals, size.

9

U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-34
(VJashington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975),
pp. 5-17.
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structure, environment, and management orientation.

It

follows that management's need for information varies from

one organization to another.

For example, a nonprofit or a

charitable organization is interested in providing its ser
vices within the limits of its revenues to those who qualify

for such services.

With the inflexibility of producing its

revenues and significance of controlling expenditures, it
may be control oriented.

The cash basis, as a method of

accounting, could very well be its best method.

A profit-

oriented organization, on the other hand, is interested in
the matching and measuring of revenues and expenses to

determine profitability.

This is because of the heavy impli

cations that a profit or loss may have on management decisions
An accrual method of accounting and cost accounting informa
tion are important in such a situation.
In short, an accounting system designed and an

accounting method selected are expected to differ from one
organization to another.

There is no "bad" system or a

"good" system; nor should there be a bad, good, or superior
method of accounting.

But the criteria for badness, good

ness, or "superiority" are relative questions that differ
as they are applied within an organizational context.

The

goals, the type, the size, and management orientation con
trol to a large degree the nature of information required
and, accordingly, the accounting system and the accounting
method to be applied.

In short, there is no one single
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system or method of accounting that can be viewed as a
panacea applicable to all organizations.
Thus far it has been demonstrated that accounting
information is both a light-throwing and a fruit-bearing

type of information and that accounting as a discipline may
be categorized as a social science.

An accounting system

and the accounting method selected are the means of receiv
ing, processing, and producing the information.

Both the

accounting system and the accounting method are expected to
vary because organizations are different in several respects.
Before concluding this chapter, reference should be
made to two important points:

Firstly, man is involved in all stages of the account

ing system.

It is man who designs the system, records and

summarizes the transactions, produces the reports and

analyzes them, communicates the information, and finally
makes the decisions.

Therefore, we cannot downplay the

relationship between accounting on the one hand and human
behavior on the other.

The relation between budgeting and

accounting and the human element will be referred to in the
subsequent chapters.

On this subject, Professor Hendriksen

stated:

A more recent emphasis in the development of
accounting theories has been the acceptance of a
communication-decision orientation.

The focus is

on the relevance of information being communicated
to decision makers and the behavior of different

20

individuals or groups as a result of the presen

tation of accounting information.^^
Secondly, speaking of accounting as an information
system, we have to acknowledge that it is but one component
of a management information system which contributes sub

stantially to the decision-making process.

Statistical

information, for example, on the number of employees or on
the number of minorities within an organization is relevant

information which is not provided through accounting records.
In the case of the government, the overall political atti

tude of the people and their preferences are also significant
information for the decision-making process; but this
information cannot be extracted from accounting records or
financial statements.

Also, complete information is still

a remote goal because of the complexity and rapid change of
pace in all aspects of life.

The point is that accounting is an information
system and is not the information system.

^^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory, 3rd ed. ^
(Homewood, Illinois:

Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 5.

CHAPTER II

THE

FEDERAL BUDGET AND

ACCOUNTING

Perhaps the most important annual document in the
United States is the budget of the federal government.

The

significance of the budget emanates from the political,
economical, social, and administrative characteristics
embodied in the budget process.

Political Characteristics of the Budget

Politically, the budget is a reflection of the
philosophy of the politicians in power, their identification
of national problems and their approach to solving them,
their determination of national priorities, and their general

policies.

The budget process, from its formulation to its

implementation, brings virtually all political actors on the
scene.

There are the agencies that prepare their budget

estimates and advocate their budget requests.

For them

their share of the pie is a sign of power and a recognition

from higher political authorities of their roles and goals.
The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) issues guidelines

to the agencies, filters their requests, and functions as
liaison between them and the President.

In this capacity

the 0MB is a powerful entity of which agencies are, or should
21
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be, aware.

The President as the head of the executive

branch transmits his basic goals and philosophy to the 0MB,
reviews, revises, and finally approves recommendations.

The

President transmits his administration's budget to Congress.
After receiving the President's budget, and before

acting on appropriations or specific measures, the budget
committees have to adopt the first concurrent resolution.

This has to be reported by April 15 so that it may be
adopted no later than May 15.

This first concurrent resolu

tion is viewed as a tentative budget where target totals
are set for budget authority, receipts, and outlays.
According to Professor Finley, ". . . the first concurrent
resolution can be expected to deal with macro economic

matters and broad functional allocations."^
The second resolution is reported after the indi
vidual appropriation bills are acted upon, and it has to be
reported by September 15.

The second resolution will either

alter the first resolution targets or will affirm it.
This resolution which is in effect the final

congressional budget or ceiling, must specify to
the appropriate committees the amounts, if any,
by which changes must be made in budget authority,
outlays and revenue and debt limits. By September
25 these committees are to report through the
Budget Committees a reconciliation bill to affect
any changes necessary to conform to the second

resolution.

Congress is not to adjourn until it

has approved this reconciliation legislation.^

^James J. Finley, "The 1974 Congressional Initiative
in Budget Making," Public Administration Review (May/June
1975):270-78.

^Ibid., p. 272.
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support, Rourke maintained that:

A vital source of power for administrative agencies
is their ability to attract the support of outside
groups. . . . There are three vital centers from
which political support may be drawn: the outside
community, the legislature, and the executive branch
itself. . . .

When an agency does have strong

external support, it may use this constituency as a
device for bringing pressure to bear upon lawmakers

to reverse legislative decisions on appropriations
that it considers disadvantageous. . . . An
agency's success in fending off budget cuts in
the House is a measure of its good rapport with
legislators;. . . good relations with the Office of
Management and Budget are an invaluable asset for any
executive agency.
The Office of Management and Budget which super
seded the Bureau of Budget pursuant to Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1970 has certain political, fiscal, and adminis
trative powers which cannot be ignored by the agencies.

To

begin with, the 0MB is the President's principal arm for the

exercise of his managerial functions.

It advises the Presi

dent on matters related to the budget, both in the preparation
phase and the implementation phase.

It is also responsible

for improvement of government organization, information, and
management systems.

Wildavsky maintained that every agency and its

officials must decide what kind of relationship to maintain
with the Budget Bureau (currently the 0MB).

He provided

three reasons why an agency would push information at the
examiners of the 0MB:

^Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public
Policy, 2nd ed. (Boston:
pp. 42-67.

Little, Brown and Company, 1976),
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1.

It helps the examiners to be competent

defenders of the agency's viewpoint.
2. They may become advocates of certain
programs.

3.

To secure administration assistance in

clearing up some difficulty.'^
Rourke stated that ". . . good relations with the Office of
Management and Budget are an invaluable asset for any execu
..5

tive agency.

Presidents are also different in their views on pub

lic policy issues and in their tactics for approaching them.
The budget for fiscal year 1978 is a good example of how
two consecutive presidents differed in this respect.

Pechman

stated:

The budget for the fiscal year beginning
October 1, 1977, and ending September 30, 1978,
which was formulated by President Ford and
revised by President Carter, contains an amalgam

of programs reflecting their very different budget

philosophies.^
Pechman provided an outstanding analysis of how the
views and philosophies of both presidents. Ford and Carter,
were different in areas such as Defense, Employment and

Training, and Social Security, to mention a few.

In the

Defense area, the Carter budget, as compared to the Ford

program, placed less emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons
and more emphasis on the readiness of military units for

^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process, 2nd ed. (Boston:
1974), p. 39.

Little Brown and Company, Inc.,

^Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, p. 67.
^Joseph A. Pechman, Ed., Setting National Priorities:
The 1978 Budget (Washington, D.C.:
1977), p. 1.

The Brookings Institution,
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combat.

President Carter's amendment to former President

Ford's budget included a reduction of $2.8 billion.

In the

area of Employment and Training, President Ford recommended
that the temporary public service employment program be

phased out in 1978 and expenditures under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act be reduced to approximately the
level that prevailed before the recent recession.
Ford also opposed the use of public works and
employment tax credits to combat unemployment.

In contrast,

President Carter requested an increase in budget authority
of about $10 billion for employment and training assistance
and $4 billion for public works over fiscal years 1977 and
1978.

In the area of Social Security, President Ford recom

mended increases in the payroll tax rate to restore the
necessary balances in the trust fund.

President Carter has

proposed that the revenue shortfall attributable to the
recession be made up by transfers from general revenues to

the trust funds.

For the future, he proposed to eliminate

the ceiling on the taxable wage base for the employer's
portion of the payroll tax and raise the ceiling for the
employees portion by $2,400 in four installments from 1979

to 1985.^
At the congressional level, members are also torn
between the two political extremes:

^Ibid., pp. 7-22.

their desire to control
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and reduce public expenditure and their desire to respond
to their constituencies by providing services and maintaining

certain programs which eventually bring about expenditures.
Sometimes a sense of identification with a particular agency

may be created because its mission is highly valued by some

members.

Wildavsky eminently illustrated these conflicting

political considerations when he said:
The desire to cut the budget may conflict with
the desire not to damage programs vital to the
nation. . . . In the case of local constituency
interests, the deviation from guardianship of the
budget is exceedingly powerful because it touches
on the most basic relationship a Congressman may

have--that with the people who elect him and
might conceivably defeat him.
Taken together, the overall picture tends to reflect
the American government's political characteristics of checks
and balances and separation of powers.

Here we face the

interplay between the Executive Branch and the Legislative
Branch.

It has always been the objective of Congress to

maintain control over the financial affairs of the govern

ment.

It is Congress who has the constitutional power to

lay and collect taxes, to borrow money on the credit of the
United State, and to coin money.

Congress, as the guardian

of the public purse, has enacted several laws to maintain
and enhance its powers to offset that of the executive branch,
The establishment of the General Accounting Office, in
accordance with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, with

Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 49.
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responsibility only to Congress, is an example of congres
sional intent.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act

of 1974 has added substantially to the powers of Congress

in dealing with two major problems that have for long
frustrated the members of Congress:

(1) backdoor spending,

to a lesser extent, which is the approval of budget authority
by routes other than the regular appropriations process; and

(2) the power of presidents to impound funds appropriated by
Congress.

While backdoor spending has been compromised

rather than resolved, the presidential power of impoundment
has been offset by congressional power to overrule presi
9

dential impoundment and to force the release of funds.

Budget cuts, authorization, and provision of funds through
appropriations are all typical examples of congressional
control.

If we accept the premise that a federal agency's
share of the budget represents the revenues allocated to it

for a fiscal year, we easily can recognize a sharp differ
ence between the process of producing revenue in a public

organization as compared with a private (business) organiza
tion.

Readily observable is the fact that management in

public organizations is deeply involved in politics, is
subject to more external political forces, and is not the
sole power in determining how much to spend, on what, and

9

See for example Michael E. Levy, The Federal Budget:

Its Impact on the Economy (New York:
Inc., 1976), pp. 27-34.

The Conference Board,
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how much revenue to expect.

In private organizations, to

the contrary, there are not too many actors who shape their
budgets.

External forces are those of the market place

(i.e., they are economic rather than political; and manage
ment, generally, has the power to decide how much to spend,

on what, and how much revenue to expect by selling its

services or commodities in the market place).

In short,

economic behavior and motivation in private organizations
provide for their revenues while political behavior and
motivation determine, to a large degree, public organiza
tions' revenues.

Economical Characteristics of the Budget
Economically speaking, the federal budget is viewed
as an economic document which serves the basic economic

functions of government within an economy of scarce

resources and competing goals.
Following Musgrave's line of thought on public

budgeting, Gardner envisioned three general responsibilities
of government:

(1) the stabilization function, which relates

to the maintenance of high levels of resource utilization
and stable price levels; (2) the distribution function,

which alters the distribution of income resulting from the
market process; and (3) the allocation function., which deals

with the satisfaction of the wants of the members of society

Wayland D. Gardner, Government Finance, National,
State and Local (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1978), pp. 3-13.
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Here, again, differences can be recognized between

public budgeting as compared to private budgeting.

The

motivation behind public budgeting is to achieve broad
national goals.

Private sector budgeting is, to a large

degree, parochial and self-interested (i.e., profit is a
basic motivation).

Profit is measurable and serves as a

ready standard for evaluating previous decisions.

Govern

mental decision making, in general, lacks this standard for

measuring its activities.

Government output, usually

intangible and immeasurable, is consumed by the nation as a
whole.

Economically, it is collectively consumed and is not

divisible among individuals.

Another distinct feature of

government output is that there is no price tag for each
service provided for each individual.

Social Characteristics of the Budget

From a social standpoint, the public is interested in
the budget document in two respects.

Firstly, how much taxes

they will be paying is the public's first or basic question.
Realistically, this is the major concern and the basic tie
between the average citizen and the budget.

Secondly, the

public questions whether government expenditure is really
helping them solve their problems.

The answer to this second

question is difficult and differs from one citizen to the

Robert D. Lee, Jr., and Ronald W. Johnson, Public
Budgeting Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975),
p. 2.
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next because it deals with evaluating the "intangible" and

because judgment is usually a matter of individual perception.
The budget can also be seen as the mechanism, by virtue of
which, the government fulfills its moral obligations and
its social responsibility towards its citizens.

This is

accomplished through certain programs administered by the
Health, Education and Welfare Agency, the Housing and Urban

Development Agency, and the Veterans Administration, to
mention a few.

For the private sector, these notions of

moral obligations and social responsibility are still con
troversial and vague issues which cannot, and will not,
override the profit motivation.

Administrative Characteristics of the Budget

From an administrative point of view, the federal

budget has been, in many cases, the starting point of any
attempt to improve government operations.

The budget reform

has always been viewed as a vehicle to bring about efficiency
and effectiveness in carrying out government activities.
Additionally, because the budget is a political document,

reforms in the budget are simultaneous with the prevailing
political climate.
In his article "The Road to PPB:

The Stages of

Budget Reform," Allen Schick succinctly has correlated both
the reform stages and the political climate.

According to

Schick, the budget was control-oriented when government was

viewed as a necessary evil and there was little recognition
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of the social value of public expenditures.

During that

time, the main function of the budget was to keep spending
in check.

However, as the work and accomplishments of

government came to be regarded and valued, coupled with
statutes to curb administrative abuses and the development

of management sciences, the budget has become management

oriented.

This management orientation focused on problems

of managing large programs and organizations.

Concepts of

efficiency, effectiveness, and performance and program
budget came to be known.

The third stage, which is planning

oriented, came after certain developments in the areas of
economic analysis and informational and decisional tech

nologies.

The past two decades have witnessed the permea

tion of many techniques into the budget process with the
intent of reforming the budget and increasing the efficiency
12

and effectiveness of government operations.

Planning Programming and Budgeting, systems analysis,
cost-benefit analysis. Management by Objectives, and Zero-

Base Budgeting are all examples of attempts to improve the
budget.

To the extent that any one or more of these tech

niques receive the "political blessing" of political actors
of the budget will decide whether these techniques will achieve
the expected results.

In the private sector organizations,

the budget is also an administrative tool for planning and

^^Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB:

The Stages of

Budget Reform," Public Administration Review 26 (December
1966):243-59.
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control.

The primary objective, however, is to maximize

profits.

Innovations in budgeting techniques are stimulated

by competition, technology, and other conditions in the
market place.

In summary, the federal budget is a political,
economical, social, and administrative document.

The budget

is a plan as well as a means of management and control.
Political considerations are of primary significance because

several political actors come into play in making decisions
about the budget.

The top management of a federal agency

is not the only decision maker in determining the agency's
fiscal resources.

The revenue of a federal agency depends

to a large degree on its mission

in relation to national

priorities, the political philosophy of politicians, and
the political support that its management can mobilize.

The

output of government operations is mostly intangible with no
price tag on each type of service.

Consumption of output is

collective and shared among all individuals.

There is no

profit motive behind government budget or operations.

These

characteristics and their implications on the decision-

making process represent the basic points of departure
between the public and private budgeting since the reverse
is usually held true for private sector organizations.

The Federal Accounting System
The basic philosophy behind the federal accounting
system can be found in the words of Alexander Hamilton, who
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was the first Secretary of Treasury:
The design of the constitution in this provision
(Section 9, Clause 7) was, as I conceive, to secure

these important ends--that the purpose, the limit,
and the fund of every expenditure should be ascer
tained by a previous law. The public security is
complete in this particular, if no money can be
expended, but for an object, to an extent, and
out of a fund, which the laws have prescribed.

This basic philosophy has been maintained, enhanced,
and developed over the years.

As seen now, the basic account

ing principles and standards in the federal agencies include,
but are not limited to, the following.

Legal Compliance Principle
According to this principle, accounting systems and
reports should ensure that all financial transactions have

been executed in accordance with the laws and regulations
and that the legal provisions or requirements have been met.

Additionally, legal provisions have precedence over generally
accepted accounting principles whenever a conflict should
arise between the two.

Fund Accounting Principle

The accounting systems are organized and operated

on a fund basis, according to this principle.

A fund is:

an independent fiscal and accounting entity with a
self-balancing set of accounts recording cash and/
or other resources together with all related

13

W. F. Powell, "Control of Federal Expenditures—A

Documentary History," quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate,
Financial Management in the Federal Government, S. Doc. 11,
87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961.
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liabilities, obligations, revenues and equities
which are segregated for the purpose of carrying
on specific activities or attaining certain objec
tives in accordance with special regulations,

restrictions or limitations.^'^
According to the Comptroller General of the United
States, the fund accounts of the federal government are of
two general types:

1.

Funds derived from general taxing and revenue

powers and from business operations.
2.

Funds held by the government in the capacity of

15
custodian or trustee.

The first type of funds is broken into:
a.

General fund accounts, which account for

collections not dedicated to specific purposes.

It accounts

also for expenditure arising under congressional appropria
tions or authorizations to spend general revenues.

b.

Special fund accounts, which account for

separate receipts that are earmarked for specific purposes.
c.

Revolving fund accounts, which exist by law

to finance a continuing cycle of operations.

Receipts are

generated mostly from outside of the government.

Revolving

fund accounts may be called public enterprise funds.

^^Municipal Finance Officers Association of the
United States and Canada, Governmental Accounting, Auditing,
and Financial Reporting (Chicago: Cushing-Malloy, Inc.,
1974), pp. 6-7.

^^U.S., Comptroller General, Accounting Principles
and Standards for Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 2.
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d.

Management fund accounts which account for

intragovernmental operations which are conducted by an agency

to provide services to other agencies on a business-like
basis.

The second type of funds may be broken into:
a.

Trust fund accounts, which account for

receipts held in trust and which, according to an agreement
or a statute, are expended for specific purposes or programs.
When it is dedicated to business-type operations, it is
called a trust-revolving fund.

b.

Deposit fund accounts, which account for

receipts held in suspense temporarily and later refunded or

paid into some other fund of the government or held by the
government as banker or agent for others and paid out at
the direction of the owner.

Such funds are not available
16

for paying other expenditures of government or salaries.
Fund control means management control over the use
of fund authorizations to insure that:

1.

Funds are used only for authorized purposes.

2.

They are economically and efficiently used.

3.

Obligations and expenditures do not exceed

the amounts authorized.

4.

The obligation or expenditure of amounts author

ized is not reserved or otherwise deferred without

^^Ibid., pp. 2-21.
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congressional knowledge and approval.

Each agency is required to have a system of adminis
trative control, approved by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, which will restrict obligations or
17

expenditures to the amounts appropriated,

Basic Structure of Accounts

The basic structure of accounts for agency opera
tions is as follows:
1.

Accounts for assets.

2.

Accounts for liabilities.

3.

Accounts for investment of the United States

government.

4.

Accounts for investment of others (if applicable).

5.

Accounts for revenues and costs.

These accounts should be adapted to each agency's

fund structure to provide an adequate accounting for all
resources, liabilities

and

obligations, expenditures,

revenues, and costs.

Management and Congressional Needs

The accounting system must provide not only a basis
for control over funds, property, and other assets but should

also provide an accurate and reliable basis for developing
and reporting costs of performance by:

^"^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
l^Ibid., p. 22.
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1.

Major organizational segments.

2.

Budget activities.

3.

Program structure.

The accounting system must be capable of producing
financial information needed to keep Congress fully informed
of the financial status and operations of the agency.

Basis of Accounting
The maintenance of accounts on the accrual basis is
20

a basic requirement for federal agencies.

These are some of the basic principles and standards

as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States.
One of these principles, the accrual basis of

accounting, will be the subject of more discussion and

analysis in this paper, beginning first with the history of
the accrual concept in the federal government.

Before concluding this chapter, it is important to
mention that the financial management in the federal govern

ment is a joint responsibility of both the legislative and
executive branches of government.

On the legislative side, the General Accounting Office,
created pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, is
empowered to audit government's financial operations, pre
scribe accounting principles and standards, review and

^^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
^^Ibid., pp. 2-14.

For an illustration of the fiscal

cycle in the federal government, see Appendix B.
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approve executive agencies' accounting systems, conduct
special studies and surveys on behalf of Congress, and
assist Congress and its committees in areas of budgeting
and accounting.

In terms of financial management, the

General Accounting Office is the right arm of Congress.
On the executive side, more than one actor comes

into play.

Firstly, the Office of Management and Budget,

which superseded the Bureau of the Budget pursuant to

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, is considered to be the
21

right arm of the President of the United States.

This

office advises and assists the President on matters related

to the budget preparation and execution and the organization
and management of the executive branch.

It is empowered to

approve the apportionment of an agency's appropriated funds
before incurring any obligation.

Secondly, the Treasury Department is responsible for
issuing and processing federal checks, collecting tax
revenues, supervising national banks, recommending financial
policies, and advising the President on financial matters.
It can be viewed as the fiscal agent for the entire govern
ment.

It is worth mentioning here that the Treasury

Department is interested in the cash basis of accounting in
order to meet its responsibility in determining whether there
is enough cash to cover expenditures or not.

^^The Bureau of the Budget was also created pursuant
to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921.

This act is recog

nized as a major step forward towards more constructive finan
cial management as it created both the General Accounting Office,
the Bureau of the Budget, and the national budget system.
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Thirdly, the General Services Administration is

responsible for property management, data processing manage
ment, vehicles, and contracting management.
These three executive agencies issue circulars,

guidelines and directives to the various federal agencies,
reflecting their areas of concern.
Fourthly, the Civil Service Commission is involved

in financial management through its responsibilities in the
areas of recruitment and training personnel in the fields of
accounting, budgeting, and others.
In order to coordinate the efforts in the financial

management area, the Joint Financial Management Improvement

Program began in 1948 as a cooperative effort among the
General Accounting Office, the Bureau of the Budget (cur
rently the Office of Management and Budget), and the
Treasury Department.

Later, the Civil Service Commission

and then the General Services Administration joined the

program.

The heads of these five agencies meet periodically

to discuss the problems, the plans, and other related
matters.

The basic objective of this program, which is still

in operation, is to improve, modernize, and solve the prob
lems in the areas of budgeting and accounting.
Finally, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act

of 1950 placed the responsibility of establishing and main
taining accounting systems and controls upon the head of
each executive agency, subject to approval by the General
Accounting Office.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF THE
IN

ACCRUAL METHOD

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The accrual method of accounting in the federal gov

ernment is a major episode in a series called "Improving
the Financial Management System in Government."

In contrast

with other measures taken, legislations enacted, or princi
ples adopted in the financial management arena, the accrual

method of accounting has been hovering for almost thirty
years and has been a subject of controversy.
This chapter provides for a historical account of

the accrual method in government from the days when it was

first recommened in 1949 by the Commission on Organization

of the Executive Branch of the Government (popularly known
as the first Hoover Commission) to the present.

Definition of Terms

Since part of the controversy, however, is a matter
of terminology, it is quite appropriate to state some defi

nitions related to the accrual method of accounting:
Accrued Expenditures

Accrued expenditures are the charges incurred during
a given period requiring the provision of funds for:
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1.

Goods and other tangible property received.

2.

Services performed by employees, contractors,

grantees, lessors, and other payees.

3.

Amounts becoming owed under programs for which

no performance or current services are required (such as
annuities, insurance claims, other benefit payments, and

some cash grants).

In essence, then, accrued expenditures are liabili
ties which have to be paid.

Accrued

Costs

Accrued costs and/or applied posts represent the
costs of resources consumed in the course of producing

tangible or intangible output and whether paid for or not.
Resources, or factors of production, include labor, materi
als, equipment, and overhead.
With these two definitions in mind, we turn to the

history of the accrual method starting with the first Hoover
Commission.

History

In its February, 1949, report on budgeting and
accounting, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government came up with thirteen basic

U.S., Comptroller General, Accounting Principles
and Standards for Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 2-15.
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recommendations covering three areas:

(1) The budget,•

(2) Office of the Budget; and (3) reorganization of account

ing in the government.

The eleventh recommendation was

followed by "other recommendations."

Application of the

accrual method was one of these other recommendations:

"Our task force on accounting recommends that the accrual

basis of accounting should be applied to both revenues and
2

expendxtures.

The task force report prepared for the Commission
in January, 1948, recommended that:
the accounts be so kept that they will show cur
rently, fully, and clearly the sources of the
funds provided for the running of the Government
and for what purposes these funds are spent;
specifically, that the accounts be kept on the

accrual basis.^
The task force emphasized that an accounting method is next

in importance to the establishment of an accounting system,
and then specifically demonstrated the significance of the
accrual method.

The task force viewed the importance of the

accrual method to be as follows:

1.

It affords full current information con

cerning the realization of the revenue estimates,
expenditures and availability of appropriation.
2. It helps control the use and prevent overexpenditure of appropriations.

7

U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Budgeting and Accounting, Report
of . . . (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,

T949), p. 43.
3

John W. Hanes, A. E. Buck, and T. Coleman Andrews,

Fiscal, Budgeting and Accounting Systems of Federal Govern
ment: A Report with Recommendations Prepared for the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1949), p. 92.

3. It helps maintain positive control of assets,
liabilities, estimates of income, appropriations,
revenues and expenses.
4. It provides a distinction between resources
consumed (expenses) and appropriation expenditure.
This, in turn, provides for a better accountability
of cost on one hand and mere cash disbursements on
the other.

5. When information is readily available, a
lot of time and effort (and consequently costs)
are saved for both the Congress and executive
agencies that would be wasted in the course of

requesting and preparing the information.^
The task force has even suggested that the cash basis be
completely ruled out.
The.case for the accrual method, however, was down

played by two factors.

First, the task force itself stated

that "We cannot too strongly urge the establishment of an

appropriate integrated system of accounting kept on the
5

accrual basis."

The task force has not provided any explana

tion for such a statement.

By alluding to the position of

the task force regarding the basic elements of the accounting
system, we can easily see that there was a recognition, on
its part of the diversity and dispersion of government

operations, a subject upon which one central operational
accounting system would be impractical.

The task force

stated that "The number, dissimilarity and geographic dis

persion of the government's activities make centralization
6

of the government's accounting impractxcal."

^Ibid., pp. 102-103

^Ibid.., p. 104.
^Ibid., p. 100.
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accounting systems are different, we have to expect reasonably

that the elements in these systems, including the accounting
methods adopted, have to be different.

Thus, to recognize

different accounting systems, while insisting

on one method

of accounting, seems somewhat inconsistent.
At any rate, the statement that "we cannot too

strongly urge the establishment of an appropriate inte

grated system of accounting kept on the accrual basis" has

not served the task force argument for the ac(prual method
Rather, it might have discouraged any serious attempt in this
regard.

The second factor which contributed to the downplay

of the case for the accrual method probably was the manner
in which the Commission itself addressed the recommendation.

Including the recommendation under "other recornmendations"
rather than as a separate recommendation reflects that the

Commission itself did not take it seriously or as a primary
issue.

Readers Of reports usually tend to tai■:e

"other

recommendations" as minor in nature while the separate and

early recommendations in a report are usually read carefully

and efforts are directed to implement them.

Additionally,

the CommissionVs wording of the recommendation did not con
sider the difference between expenditure and cost.
In 1950 the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act was
passed and incorporated several recommendations of the

Hoover Commission.

The Act, however, was silent regarding
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the accrual basis.

It did not specify explicitly in any of

its provisions that the accrual basis is mandatory.

Never

theless, the language used in certain provisions of the Act
could be interpreted to mean that the accrual;basis should
be used.

According to Carl Tiller:

The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950 did not mention the words "accrual" or

"accrued" but it implied the accrual basis by
the use of other terminology which is used by the
professional accountants in relation to adcrual

systems."^
As an example, the Act uses such phrases as "full disclosure
of the results of the financial operations."

Yet, the

accrual basis "by implication" is not forceful enough to

have agencies adopt it as a method of accounting.
In 1952, another step,was taken by the Comptroller
General of the United States when he issued principles and

standards for agency accounting systems statihg that:
, . . the accrual basis has long been accepted as
the standard in the commercial world and, although
much progress has been made in this respect in
Federal government accounting, further emphasis on
accrual accounting is needed for continued progress

in increasing the contribution which accoianting can
make to financial management. . . .
i
In June, 1955, the Hoover Commission in its second

round of endeavor came up with two major recommendations in

respect to the accrual basis, from a total of twenty-five

7

Carl W. Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense
Management Journal 5 (Summer 1969):29. At that time Mr.
Tiller was a special advisor on Budgetary Development for
the United States Bureau of the Budget (currently the 0MB).
O

U.S., General Accounting Office, Accounting Princi
ples, Memorandum No. 1, November 26, 1952, quoted in Carl W.
Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense Management Journal
5 (Summer 1969)':30.
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recoiTUTiendations on budget and accounting.

The first of

these dealt with the budget and the second dealt with
accountingf.

'

.

Regarding the annual- accrued.expenditure budget:,
the Commission recommended that "the^ executive budget and

congressional appropriations: be in terms of estimated annual
accrued expenditures, namely charges for the cost of goods
■ .9

and services estimated to be received."

■

■■ ' ■

"

This recommendation,

aimed at restoration of congressional control of the purse,

was probably thought of as an integral part o£ an'overall
accrual basis of accounting and budgeting in the goyernment.
The reasons behind this recommendation may be stimmarized as
follows:

1. "Obligations incurred" is a flexible concept
which has been interpreted differently by different

people. ~There is a tendency in executive agencies
to state the obligations incurred at the highest
possible figures since this action strengthens the
budget requests for the following year. . . .
2. The present annual budget is not an effec
tive instrument for controlling expenditures as it
is not directed to controlling the costs to be
incurred in carrying out approved programs. . . .

3. The obligation basis of appropriations pro
duces an incentive in the agencies to use all
available obligational authority prior to the date
when it otherwise would lapse for obligating purposes.
Such action tends to support agency budget requests
for the following fiscal year. . . .

9

.

,

■

.

.

U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive

Branch of the Government, Budget and Accounting, Report
of . . . (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
1955), p. 25.
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4.

There is no direct and effective ccntrcl

ever the. annual budget surplus cr deficit. This is
due tc the fact that the appropriations which Con
gress enacts each year are intended to control not
annual expenditures but the level of obligations
which the agencies mav incur, sometimes over
several years. . .

Regarding the accrual basis of accounting, the
Commission recommended that:

Government accounts be kept on the accrual basis to
show currently, completely and clearly all resources
and liabilities, and the costs of operations.
Furthermore, agency budgeting and financial report
ing should be developed from such accrual accounting.
The reasons for this recommendation were:

This proliferation of allocations,, allotment,
and sub-allotments is an attempt to effect manage
ment control. The system in itself does not
usually provide management with the financial
information required for measuring the efficiency
and economy with which funds are used.

Accounting limited primarily to accounting
for obligations and expenditures does not fulfill
these requirements.
The public and the Congress are entitled to
know the real cost of each significant Government

undertaking. . . .^^
Reference is always made to the second Hoover Com

mission whenever the subject of accrual accounting in
government is raised.

Few, if any at all, would allude to

dissents made by three honorable members of the Commission.
Commissioner Clarence J. Brown stated:

I cannot fully accept Recommendation No. 7 to con
vert the congressional appropriations structure
to an estimated annual accrued expenditures basis.

^°Ibid., pp. 13-20.

^^Ibid., p. 38 (Recommendation No. 14).
^^Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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This is a radical departure from,a long-standing
fiscal policy which would require widespread changes
in our entire appropriations process. I am, there
fore, unwilling to give it a blanket endorsement
without the benefit of further study by appropriate
Committees of the Congress.

Commissioner James A. Farley stated that:

Theoretically these recommendations may be
desirable from an accounting point of view; but I
am not certain that put into effect they will pro
duce the desired objectives.
This report has been approached from the view

point of a cost accountant operating in a private
commercial enterprise, in which goods and services
are produced and sold for the avowed purpose of
providing a profit to those whose capital is
invested. That may be an appropriate concept for
certain governmental operations which are similar
to private commercial ventures and, in fact, is
currently in use by many such governmental organi
zations as stated in the report; it does not seem
to me, however, to be appropriate across the board
to all government activities and operations. Even
where cost accounting is used, it does not necessarily
provide a measure of the effectiveness of programs
which are not primarily related to profit but to the
performance of proper governmental functions. The
transition to the "cost basis" accounting will
require tremendous expense and inconvenience, and
there is insufficient evidence that it will be

universally workable and wprthwhile.
I am hopeful that the appropriate congressional
committees to which this report is referred will
very carefully examine and explore the possible
effects of these recommendations.

Finally, Commissioner Chet Holifield stated that:

I am concerned about the potential effects of

certain Commission recommendations in the report on
Budget and Accounting and therefore make these
qualifying observations.
The report tends to exalt the role of the
accountant in government just as the Commission
Report on Legal Services tends to exalt the role of
the lawyer in government.

l^Ibid., p. 69.
Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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The basis for preparing government budgets and
for justifying appropriation requests would be
drastically revised, with emphasis on cost and
accrual accounting and presentation of budget
requests in broad.categories.
Whether these technical recommendations actually
would tighten congressional control of the public
purse and bring about improvements in management
and greater economies, as claimed, it is difficult
to determine. Cost and accrual accounting may be
useful in certain agencies engaged in procurement,
lending and other business-type operations, but I
do not see how these accounting techniques could be
applied universally in the government with bene
ficial results.

Many government operations and services do not
lend themselves to commercial accounting treatment,
nor can their value to the public always be measured
by cost criteria. The government is not a profitmaking organization organized around sales to a
market. The perfonnance of its functions does not
have the common denominator of dollar returns which

can be compared with costs.
The end result of the Commission's recommenda

tion may be formal consistency in accounting princi
ples rather than actual gains in economy and
efficiency.
While the arguments for the recommendations are pro
fessionally oriented and technically provocative, the

statements made by the three honorable commissioners, or

say their arguments against the recommendations, are realis
tically grounded and politically oriented.
The controversy over accrued expenditure and accrued
cost was discussed by Erie Cato in his critique of the second

Hoover Commission report:
The accrued expenditure package falls short in
three respects. First, it does not provide a firm
and positive congressional control over operations
and cost of operations and it makes inadequate
provision for equivalent agency control at any echelon.

^^Ibid., pp. 71-72.
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Second, use of accrued expenditure control will
militate against development of accurate costs for

use in computing the amount of accrued expenditure
appropriations. And, third, it makes no provision
whatever for review or control of those items

usually reflected in balance sheet accounts. . . .
The author is totally unable to understand
why the second Hooyer,Commission, having done such
an excellent job to the point of determining the
control to be used, should have suddenly taken off
on the tangent of accrued expenditures. Each step
taken led directly towards a single logical con
clusion, to control cost. Why, then, did the
Commission fail to take that last step, to recom

mend appropriations in terms of allowable accrued
costs?lo

On August 1, 1956, Public Law 84-863 was'enacted
and provided for the use of costs in accounting and budget

ing in the federal executive agencies.

Among the several

provisions of this law to implement some of the second
Hoover Commission there was the provision mandating that

government accounts be maintained and kept on the accrual
basis:

As soon as practicable after the date of enact
ment of this subsection, the head of each executive

agency shall, in accordance with principles and
standards prescribed by the Comptroller General, cause
the accounts of such agency to be maintained on an
accrual basis to show the resources, liabilities, and

costs of operations of such agency with a view to
facilitating the preparation of cost based budgets
as required by section 216 of the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921, as amended. The accounting
system required by this subsection shall include
adequate monetary property accounting records as
an integral part of the system.

^^Erle Cato, "'Accrued Cost,' Not 'Accrued Expendi
tures,' Is the Answer for Government," Accounting Review 34
(July 1959):392-98.

^'^31 U.S.C. 66 a; 70 Stat. 783 (1956).

This law represented, by far and large, a major step forward
regarding the accrual method as it made it explicitly manda
tory for each agency.

The law, however, left off completely

the recommendation regarding stating the annual appropria
tions on an accrual basis (Recommendation No. 7) as a result

of the pressure and insistence of the House of Representatives

The exclusion of this recommendation has clearly demonstrated
the political-professional controversy over the issue.

The

major objection of this recommendation to be included in
Public Law 84-863 was that:

It would necessarily lead to contract authority for
programs which extend beyond one fiscal year. It
was felt that contract authority weakened congres
sional control, and it would not realize the

benefits claimed. .. . .^

:

,

The concern of the legislative branch over the ques

tion of contract authority may be justified.

By stating

appropriations on the basis of obligational authority, the
appropriations in this sense imply the authorization to

obligate.

This authorization is controlled by Congress.

On

the other hand, if appropriations have to be stated in terms

of accrued expenditures, the implication is that appropria

tions will be stated not only in terms of obligations and
authorization but would also be stated in terms of what is

expected to be received during the year in terms of services
"] O

°U.S., Senate Committee on Government Operations,

Financial Management in the Federal Government (Washington,
D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 93-94.
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and supplies regardless of when obligated.

This, in turn,

may entail empowering certain agencies contractual authority
and might commit funds beyond what Congress may authorize.
Two years later, in August Of 1958, Public Law
85-759 was enacted providing:
Whenever the President determines there has been

established a satisfactory system of accrual accounting
for an appropriatiqn or fund account, each proposed
appropriation thereafter transmitted to the Congress
for such account pursuant to the provisions of this
Act shall be accompanied by a proposed limitation on
annual accrued expenditures. The President may
include in the Budget with any such proposed limi
tation,on annual accrued expenditures, proposals
for provisions authorizing the head of a department
or establishment to make transfers, within his
department or establishment, between such limitations

on annual accrued expenditures; and such provisions

may limit by amount or by p^^ centum the size of any
transfer so proposed. . . .
It should be noted that the tendency of Congress to

exercise maximum possible control over the executive budget
was a major factor to exclude the recommendation of submitting
appropriation on an annual estimated accrued expenditure,
from Public Law 14-863 in 1956, when the Congress felt that

such a measure would reduce its power of control.

Yet, the

political spirit soon prevailed and after two years of debate

and argument, the result was a political compromise over a

technical question.

It is called a compromise because Public

Law 85-759 of 1958 came to be different from the original
Recommendation No. 7 of the second Hoover Conmission,

^^31 U.S.C. 11; 42 Stat. 20 (1958)

■
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^

mainly to satisfy congressional powers.

Should this prove

anything, it would prove a major characteristic in govern
ment; namely, that technical grounds are not alone sufficient

for government decisions and operations.

Political grounds

come into play with equal, if not sometimes superior, force
to shape both decisions and operations.

It should be noted

that the late President Eisenhower was involved in this

matter and urged the Congress on four separate occasions,

between 1956 and 1957, to enact the necessary legislation to
implement the second Hoover Commission's recommendation

regarding the placement of appropriations on an annual
accrued expenditure.

It was not until August, 1958, when the legislation
was enacted that it came to be quite different from the

original recommendation, according to the House Committee
on Appropriations in I960;.

Further, the House Committee on

Appropriations in 196Q eliminated budget proposed accrued

expenditure limitations oh all six appropriations as recom
mended by the President and did the same thing on all twelve
■ ■ ■.

■ .' ^

.

20

appropriations in the 1961 budget.

Practically, Public

Law 85-759 was not put into operation.

As a result of this action (Public Law 85-759 expires
on April 1, 1962), Congress or the executive branch
Of Government has not had an opportunity to evaluate

the results of^the accrued expenditure limitation
in operation.
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For a detailed
narrative on this particular issue,
see U.S., Senate Committee on Government Operations,

Financial Management in the Federal Government (Washington
D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 98-110.

21jj3jLd., p. 110.
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Tiller stated that while the recommendation to change the

basis of appropriations fell flat, the message got through
that accrual accounting was desirable.
In October, 1957, the President's Commission on

Budget Concepts reported its recommendations which had the

Objective of improving the federal budget and making it i
more useful.

Among its major recommendations, there was one

related to the accrual concept.

The fifth recommendation,

of a total of thirteen recommendations, came to read:

"^With respect to timing, the Commission recom
mends that budget expenditures and receipts be
reported on an accrual basis instead of the present
cash basis. . . .

This is a logical use of the modern cost account
ing systems which most government agencies have
adopted in recent years, and will result in budget
totals which provide a better measure of the impact
of government activities on the economy. This change

cannot be affected immediately, but apparently can be
done for expenditures and for corporation income
taxes and certain other receipts beginning With the
presentation in January, 1970 of the President's

budget for fiscal year 1971.22

;

Notable here is the exclusion of individual income

tax which, according to the Commission, required further

study.

The Commission maintained an intelligible distinc

tion among appropriations, obligations, accrued expenditures,

and program costs.

Appropriations are the initial point of

decision by Congress regarding the magnitude and direction
of government expenditures.

Obligations represent that part

of appropriation which has been legally committed.

Accrued

expenditures are a measure of the value of goods and services
received by a government agency and are a measure of the

^^Report of the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts (Washington, D.C.:
1967), pp. 7-8. :
1

Government Printing Office,
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economic impact of government activities.

Program costs

represent resources actually consumed, regardless of when
they were acquired.

i

It is clear, then, that there is a difference

between accrued expenditures and costs'.

The Commission,

however, emphasized the accrued expenditure concept as a
measurement for understanding the economic impact of the

federal budget and for fostering the concept of cost control.

Speahirig Of the accrual concept in the federal gov

ernment, Professors Anthony and Herzlinger made the following
comment on the Commission's recommendation:

Indeed, the whole movement received something ,

of a setback in 1967 when a prestigious cornmittee
recommended that the basic concepts should be

"accrued expenditures," which is just enough dif
ferent from, and inferior to, true accrual account
ing to muddy the water.

This argument is similar to that made by Cato in
1959 when he criticized the accrued expenditure concept as
contained in the second Hoover Commission report.

They

share the view that "accrued expenditure" is inferior to

"accrued cost," when in fact each concept serves to communi

cate a different type of information.

The former is widely

held to measure the economic impact of government operations;
the latter serves to measure the cost of these operations.

^^Ibid.:, pp. 36-46.
24

Robert N. Anthony and Regina E. Herzlinger,

Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations (Homewood,
Illinois:

Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 53.
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It is clear that the President's Commission had dif

ferent views from both those offered by the first Hoover
Commission task force and the second Hoover Commission.

While the task force of the first Hoover Commission suggested

that the cash basis be completelY ruled out, the President's

Commission emphasized the^ significance of cash receipt and
expenditure information when xt stated:

The proposed accrual concept cannot replace cash
receipt and expenditure information for Treasury cash
balance management and public debt management. Cash
records are indispensable for the proper discharge
of the Treasury's role of banker for the Government. .. .
Reporting of expenditure on an accrual basis
will not impinge in any way on the present appropria
tions process. . . . i Appropriations will continue
to be the critical point of congressional control
over the expenditure process. . .
Also, while the second Hoover Commission recommended that

appropriation be on an annual accrued expenditure basis, the
President's Commission did not contemplate any change on the

then present appropriation process.
The President's Commission believed that it was

possible to implement its recommendation on the accrual basis
■

■

■i

■

'

according to the followinjg target dates:
1.

■

■ ■' .

July 1, 1968, for review, testing, and internal

monthly reporting of accrued expenditures for most of the
government.

2.

January, 1970, accrued expenditure data to be

available for President's budget for, fiscal year 1971.

^^Report of the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts, pp. 39-40.

3.

July 1, 1970, to be the starting date to report

monthly expenditures to tjhe public on the accrual basis.
The provision of a time table to implement the
recommendation on accrual accounting represented a positive
step on the part of the President's Commission.

In general,

when a goal is sought to be achieved, it is a sound practice
to set a target date for Jthe goal to be attained through a
series of mileposts within a schedule.

In 1968, the three central entities responsible for

the financial management marshalled their efforts to bring
about the changeover to the accrual method.

The Bureau of

the Budget (currently the Office of Management and Budget)
issued its Bulletin Number 68-10 on April 26, which provided

federal agencies with information and instructions.

The

General Accounting Office issued its instructions on May 4,

and the Treasury Department issued its instructions on
June 20.

Each of the three entities gave instructions within

the scope of its responsibilities.
On February 22, 1969 former President Nixon, in a

memorandum to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Council

of Bconoraic Advisors, stated in part:
The accrual basis of accounting has long been
recognized as the most appropriate basis for pro
viding a fair disclosure of financial condition and
pperating results in the private sector of our
nation's business. Since 1956, accrual accounting
has been a statutory standard for the government
itself, but one which has been but imperfectly
achieved. . .

>
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I hereby reaffirm the objective of placing our
budgets and financial^reports on the accrual basis
recommended by the President's Commission. Please
continue vigorous joint effort with the Comptroller
General of the United States to that end.

I am

expecting the heads of the various departments and
agencies to give their personal attention toward

/

achieving this objective at the earliest practicable
date, but not later than the end of this fiscal

year, so that the conversion can be made effective
with the budget to be transmitted to Congress in
January 1971.
The target data could not be met, however.

In

April, 1970, the Bureau of the Budget allowed agencies to

report their 1972 budget figures on a modified accrual
basis; but in September, 1970, the modified accrual basis
instructions were rescinded, and the cash basis was

restored for the 1972 budget.

The target for the accrual

basis was moved to the 1973 budget.
Thirty years after the concept was first introduced,
the achievement is not commensurate with the degree of

support and efforts demonstrated.

Three prestigious com

missions recommended its application.

The - Budget and

Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 implied it.
84-863 in 1956 explicitly made it mandatory.

Public Law
Late President

Eisenhower endorsed it; former President Nixon confirmed it;
and the Treasury Department, the Office of Management and

Budget, and the General Accounting Office rallied their
'

'

■

.^

'

■

■

■

■

efforts through bulletins and instructions, to implement it.

'

■

O

U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Record Service, 1968 - ),
Richard M. Nixon, 1969.
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However, in his annual report for 1977, the Comp
troller General of the United States maintained that:

The approval of 14 Department of Defense accounting
systems and 7 civil department and agency systems
during fiscal year 1977 brought the total number
of system designs approved by the Comptroller
General to 198, or 60 percent.

The Comptroller General, on another occasion, stated
the same fact in a different way when he mentioned that:
Twenty-seven years ago, the Congress passed the

Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. . . .
When Congress passed that bill I am sure it never
suspected that 27 years later 40 percent of the
eligible government accounting systems would still
not be approved. But that is the case. At this
time 132 accounting systems in 34 agencies remain

unapproved,^^
The Comptroller General implied that the accrual
method of accounting is a part of this problem when he

'

stated on the same occasion that:

It means they (government accountants) must con
stantly do more to convince their management that . . .
good accounting means accounting on the accrual
basis in accordance with the Comptroller General's
prescribed principles and standards.
Further, there is no assurance to date that financial

reporting is made on the accrual basis.

According to the
30

Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year 1979,

the following

conclusions may be drawn:

^"^U.S., Comptroller General, 1977 Annual Report
(Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 53.

^^Elmer Staats, U.S., Comptroller General,"A Good
Accounting System--A Key to Good Management," Journal of
Accountancy (February 1978):66-69. ,

^^Ibid.
on

See Appendix C.
departments were selected.

Only a few programs within some
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1.

There is still a heavy emphasis placed on the

concept of obligations.
2.

The term "change in selected resources" as it

appears in the Budget Appendix means obligations or commit
ments for undelivered orders and which is added to the

funded program costs.

The term cannot be construed to mean

changes in costs on the accrual basis.

In light of the foregone historical background and
developments, two questions emerge and seem persistent:
Firstly, during the past thirty years, what could

conceivably have been the problems impeding full conversion
to the accrual method in the federal government?

Secondly, regardless of full or partial conversion,

is it really necessary to apply the concept of the accrual
method in the federal government?
While some o f the answers were provided in the course

of the historical development, it is commendable to treat
the answers to these two questions in more depth in the
following chapters, beginning with an identification of the

problems that have been facing the application of the concept.

CHAPTER IV

THE ACCRUAL METHOD IN PERSPECTIVE:
AN ANALYSIS. OF THE PROBLEMS

The historical acGount provided for in the preceding

chapter was concluded by raising two logical questions.
These questions deal with the problems that have been

impeding the progress in applying the accrual method in the
government for thirty years, and whether it is necessary to
apply the concept of accrual accdunting in the federal
government.

The first question could be viewed as an analysis

of the constraints which the concept has undeirgone.

The

second question in essence is an analysis of the pros and
cons regarding accrual accounting in the government.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and

identify the problems; the next chapter is devoted to an
analysis of the pros and cons.

Finally, a conclusion is

provided in the last chapter.
It should be noted that the discussion and analysis
in this chapter and the next two chapters are related to
the accrual method in terms of accrued costs, accrued
revenue, and determination of assets and liabilities.
For the past thirty years there have been several

■ : 62 :
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problems which have impeded a wide andVsuccessful applica
tion of one of the most cherished concepts of the accounting

profession.

Many of these problems continue and will con

tinue to function as constraints in the face of a wide and

successful application of the accrual method and, 'as such,
can be used as arguments against it.

These problems may be classified in terms of a

variety of administrative, behavioral, technical, and
political constraints.

Administrative Constraints

According to the General Accounting Office, many
factors have contributed to the lack of faster progress in
installing accrual accounting methods.

The following are

the administrative constraints contributing to the slow
progress:

1.

Lack of top management interest in the subject.

2.

Lack of leadership within an agency,

3.

Slow development of work measurement and

program performance standards for use with cost data.

ment of

4.

Inadequate funds.

5.

Priority concern with other matters.

6.

Lack of understanding of usefulness to manage

. ■

■

■ ■

■ 1' ■ • '■

the reliable cost and financial information.

'

^U.S. , General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
(Washington, D.C. : 1970) , pp. 30-31.

■

'
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In short, lack of management support has been a

primary constraint.

This is very true because management

support is a prerequisite for successful system implementa
tion.

The adequacy of funds is an essential factor because

it is a well known fact that the cost of any system tends to

be high in its early stages of design and implementation.
This is due to the studies and analytical work that should

be performed, in addition to the training of employees,

testing and verifying results, purchasing of new forms; and,
in many" instances, both the old and the new systems are run

parallel to each other for a period of time until the old
system is phased out.

Further, there is the extra time,

effort, and costs associated with closing the books at year
end, reconciling, and adjusting the accounts. VJhen funds
available are barely sufficient to meet an agency's mission,
it is less likely that management would allocate part of its

already scarce resources to other activities.

The lack of

understanding on the part of the management of reliable cost
and financial information could be due to "failure of account

ants to convince agency management that better accounting is
worthwhile."

The truth is that it is not lack of understanding

but rather lack of belief on the part of management of the
usefulness of reliable cost and financial information.

First,

when we speak of top management at the federal level we are
n

Elmer Staats, U.S., Comptroller General, "A Good

Accounting System--A Key to Good Management
Accountancy .(February 1978):66-69. .

Journal of
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speaking of administration; and since administration is not
separate from politics, administrators know that their
decisions are primarily political rather than economical

and, consequently, they have not had such a firm belief
that their decisions should necessarily be based on

strictly cost data and financial information as in the
case of the private sector enterprises.

Secondly,

agency administrators could have been reluctant to spend

monies, time, and effort for the changeover to the accrual

method when in fact "it is not likely that anyone can prove
subsequently what cost reductions have occurred because
management will have better financial information under the
accrual basis.

Behavioral Constraints

There is a common agreement among behavioral scien

tists that organizational change often results in resistance
on the part of employees.
explain this phenomenon.

Several theories are offered to
The tension release theories of

human behavior are but examples of such theories.

Basically,

employees are psychologically comfortable with familiar pro

cedures.

When they are called upon for a change, they are

expected to change their established patterns of behavior.
The pressures to cope with the new system, coupled with fear

of failure, result in feelings of alienation and insecurity.
3

Carl W. Tiller, "Why Accrual Accounting?" Defense
Management Journal 5 (Summer 1969);29.

Consequently, resistance occurs until such feelings are gone.
The General Accounting Office stated that lack of
enthusiasm for change was among the factors that contributed
to lack of faster progress in installing the accrual method.
The insensitivity to and resistance towards change

have been known as the inertia of bureaucracy.

This is a

kind of rigidity that grows out of prolonged role enactment.
Thompson maintained that:

Dependence-^ upon specialization imparts to modern
organizations certain qualities. Among these are
routinization, strong attachment to subgoals,
impersonality, categorization, resistance to change.

It has to be understood that many of the managerial

and accounting techniques have evolved in the private sector
Over a relatively long period of time.
ment is somewhat different.

The case in govern

Too many techniques have been,

in the past twenty-five years, introduced to the public
agencies,

ppBS, MBO, and ZBB.

The natural result

is confusion and role conflict on the part of both the admin
istration and the employees who were required to comprehend,
implement, and cope with these various techniques.

It is

possible to conclude that some adverse behavioral implications
have occurred.

First, shifting emphasis, from one technique

■^Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Bureaupath
ology," quoted in David R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer and
Ross A. Webber, Organizational Behavior and the Practice of
Management (Chicago:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973) ,
p. 405.

■

to another over a short period of time creates nothing but

lack of confidence in what is being done.

demise of PPBS

Second, with the

coupled with the lack of follow up to

enforce accrual accounting and the changing emphasis towards
other techniques such as MBQ and ZBB, it has created a

feeling among federal employees that nothing is really
serious about any technique.

As a matter of fact, the

demise of PPBS has probably fostered federal employees'
feelings that their own way of doing things is the best;
and, thus, they tend to enhance their resistance against
any other technique.

Technical Constraints

Among the reasons cited by the General Accounting

Office was the shortage of technically qualified personnel.^
Federal accountants have long been experienced in government

accounting following the obligation method of accounting.

To deplore lack of technically qualified personnel would be
unfair because they are not expected to be familiar with
accrual accounting, and it is not the accrual method that

makes the technicariy qualified accountants.
Another meaning could be associated with the tech

nically qualified personnel.

It is possible that the lack

of systems analysts and systems accountants who are a major

U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
(Washington, B.C.: 1970), pp. 30-31.
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force that deals with fiscal systems is causing the problem.

Exactly what is meant iDy lack of technically qualified per
sonnel was not clarified by the General Accounting Office.
On the other hhnd, the meaning of the accrual method

has not been clearly defined.

Whether it means a modified

accrual system, accrued expenditure, or accrued costs is not

yet precise.

There isino doubt, however, that this adds to

the technical difficuli:ies in applying the concept in practice.
This point will be further analyzed under the pros and cons
for the accrual method;.

Political Constraints

The administrative, behavioral, and technical con

straints may be viewed!as common systems problems which
could be overcome.
for thirty years.

Thbse constraints, alonb, cannot last
The:government does not lack the experts

to solve these problems, nor does it take these experts
thirty years to solve the problems.
The real factors behind this lag in applying the

accrual method are strictly political.

After thirty years

it can be safely concluded that political constraints repre
sent the major stumblihg block.

Political constraints, in

contrast to the other constraints, can stand alone and last

fcr many years.

|,

'

•

~

According to the Gbneral Accounting Office, lack of

conviction that Gongrehs meant what it said in the law about

/

■ 'f ■ ,
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accounting improvements was among the problems impeding
faster progress toward;adoption of the accrual method.

It

was demonstrated in the preceding chapter that three members
of the second Hoover Commission dissented from the recommenda

tions related to accrual accounting and budgeting. It was

also shown that Congress defeated the recommendation regarding
the appropriations in terms of estimated annual accrued expen-,,

ditures.

Also, the passage of Public Law 84-863, in 1956,

has never meant so farjthat Congress is really behind it.

It

appears likely-that had Congress been in complete support of

the concept, the appliGation would have become a reality a

long time ago, as in the case with many other recommendations
and changes.

The truth is that Congress itself is comforta

ble with the budgeting and accounting practices as they are.

Not only that, but Congress also feels that the budget is its
major tool of control over the executive branch and feels that

any change in practices might tip the balance of power in
favor of the executivejbranch.

Stated differently, under a

set of practices in budgeting and accounting, there is a
pattern of power relationship prevailing between Congress
and the executive branch.

When this set of practices is

changed, chances are that the power relationship will
change.

Therefore, Congress tends to resist, positively and

negatively any change that it feels would decrease its powers.
*Ibid., pp. 30-t31

:

:
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By positive resistancejis meant that Congress may openly
criticize, oppose, andirefrain from making a law to enact or

prohibit a -certain measure.

By negative resistance is meant

that Congress may not Support and push for a certain measure
to be put into practice or prohibit it whether there is a
law for it or not.

Consequently, the mere issuance of a law

does not.mean much unlfess Congress is really behind the issue
■ . .

i

■

and mobilizes its forces for its achievement.

On the basis o:^ this analysis, we may state that the
recommendation pertaining to reporting the appropriations in
terms of estimated annual accrued expenditure was met with a

positive resistance, while the accrual concept in government
accounting was^met with the negative type of resistance
despite the enactment pf Public Law 84-863 in 1956.

This negative resistance is exemplified in:
a lack of consistent follow up by the Congress on the
degree to which policies that they adopted 27 years
ago had been put ihto practice by the executive
agencies. . . . The failure of both Congress and 0MB
to push hard enough for better and approvable account
ing systems has resulted in G.A.O.'s being primarily
responsible for leadership in this area. While we do

not object to this I leadership role, there have been
numerous occasions|when we would have welcomed strong

support from 0MB and the Congress.7
■

■ .

Another illustration of political constraints is the
■■

•

■

■
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■

■

■

'

frequent changes at the highest levels of organizational
■ ■ ■

■

•

echelon.

■

.

. ;

•

I

■

■

■■

taries and under-secretaries.
' ■ ■ •

7

,

•

'

'
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■

Such changes are political as they involve secre

■

■

■

■

i

i

This has been brought up by
■

■■

Elmer Staats,|U.S., Comptroller General, "A Good
Accounting System-^A Kpy to Good Management," Journal of
Accountancy (February 1978):67-68.
.

■'
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Comptroller General Elmer Staats when he stated:
First, it is true that in many agencies there
have been rather frequent changes in top management

not only at the secretarial level but at the assis
tant secretary level where accounting responsibili
ties lie. This makes it tough for accountants
because accounting systems design projects are

usually long-term undertakings and are greatly
helped by continuity in management. . . . .
In our political system, although it is the
best in the world, frequent changes in top manage
ment iu'the agencies seem unavoidable. . . .
Accountants need to do a better job of showing
management—including each new management as it
comes along—that good accounting systems mean good
information and good information means, better and
sounder decisions.

The government's lack of the kind of managerial
continuity often found in industry places a special
burden on government accountants and auditors. It
means they must continually do more to convince
their management that.

Good accounting goes beyond mere fund control.
Good accounting means accounting on the accrual
basis in accordance with the Comptroller General's
prescribed principles and standards.
Good accounting is worthwhile because it pro
vides the basis for sound financial decisions.

Good accounting will result in ot>taining the
approval of the Comptroller General as required by
law.^

In summary, a set of constraints, the most powerful
of which are political, have impeded a wide application of

the concept of accrual accounting, although accepted in
principle.

The arguments for and against the accrual method in
government are discussed in Chapter V.

Ibid., p. 67

CHAPTER V

THE PROS

AND CONS FOR THE
IN

ACCRUAL METHOD

GOVERNMENT

The proponents of a change, any change, have to dem

onstrate and prove two basic points.

First, they have to

show the inadequacy and/or the weaknesses of the current
practices in light of achieving goals; and, second, they have
to provide the evidence that the proposed change will achieve
those goals which could not be achieved under the current

practices, or that the change will better achieve those goals
by eliminating the weaknesses of the present practices.
The opponents of a change, conversely, have to dem
onstrate the adequacy and the strengths of the current
practices in terms of achieving goals and have to show that

the proposed change will not help in achieving the goals in
a better way.

This section of the paper is devoted to a discussion
and analysis of these two reciprocal positions.

Each reason

for the change will be followed immediately by its counter
part.

As a note, the current practices refer to the obliga

tion basis of budgeting and accounting as practiced in the

federal government.

The proposed change is that pertaining
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to the accrual method which recognizes both revenue and cost,

regardless of whether cash is received or disbursed.
The pros and cons may be grouped under the following
major headings:
1.

Conceptual and terminology problems.

2.

Effective controls.

3.

Behavioral aspects.

4.

Accurate measurement of cost.

5.

Better information.for decision making.

6.

The sucGessful experience of the private sector

with the accrual method.

Following is a discussion and analysis of each of the
above major points.

Conceptual and Terminology Problems

The pros of the change maintain that the term
"obligatibns" lacks precise definition and is interpreted

differently by many people.^ While the General Accounting
Office used to define obligations as the actual and estimated
liabilities, the Department of Treasury and the Bureau of the

Budget (currently the Office of Management and Budget) defined
obligations within legal context (i.e., liabilities arising
from .transaGtions such as contracts or services rendered and

for which appropriation has been reserved).

As a result.

^This argument was introduced by the second Hoover
Commission in its report in 1955.

' 7^

there existed no uniform, reliable, or meaningful data on

obligations.

For example, agencies may report more than one

set of figures for the same data which is arrived at according
to what is meant by obligations for each set of figures.
This, in turn, has resulted in confusion and dissatisfaction
by Congress.

-This argument, however, does not justify the change
from the obligation to the accrual method because the remedy

of such deficiency would lie in a coordinated and consistent

definition which could be applied to the concept of obliga
tions.

This is exactly what Congress did by.issuing the

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955.

Section 1311 of

this act mandated that no amount be recorded as an obligation

unless it' is supported by a documentary evidence of a binding

agreement, a valid loan agreemerit, an order required by law or

issued by law, a grant of subsidy payable, a liability arising
from a pending litigation, employment or services, or any

other legal liability.

This law was construed to constitute

a definition of obligatxons.

Additionally, the proposed accrual concept is still
no less controversial than the obligations concept.

According

.S., Congress, Senate, Financial Management in the
Federal Government,' S. Doc. 11, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961.
3

Ibid., pp. 85-88.
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to Ticrney and Hoffman:

Complicating the lag in implementing a concept
of accounting that has been accepted in principle by
the private sector is the varying definitions and
interpretations of the concepts inherent in accrual
accounting.

In the government, accrual accounting could refer
to accrued expenditures or accrued costs--and a dis
tinction is not always maintained. . . .

While accrued expenditures refer to liabilities

incurred as a result of goods and services received, the
accrued costs refer to the costs of resources consumed.

The

concept is complicated further by the existence of several
methods of determining eccrued expenditures:
1.

The forecast method, under which the estimated

liabilities are recorded at the beginning of the accounting
period; and as cash payments are made, they are charged
against this estimated amount.

2.

The inventory method, whereby the transaction's

are recorded on a cash basis; and at the end of the period,

receivables, payables, and other liabilities are inventoried.
3.

The continuity method, which essentially recog

nizes, records, and reports every transaction throughout the
accounting period.

Needless to say, each method yields a different set
of results on the accrued expenditures.

Most importantly is the view that there is not much

'^Gornelius E. Tierney and Robert D. Hoffman, Federal
Financial Management's Accounting and Auditing Practices
(New York:

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,

19761, p. 90.

^Ibid., pp. 90-95.
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difference between obligations, accrued expenditures, and
costs, when the transactions are incurred and settled

immediately or after, a relatively short period of time.

The

impact of this view is the different explanations of
"immediate or relatively short period of time."

Under such

circumstances, there will not be a consistent reporting

approach among various agencies or even within the same
agency from one period to another.

In short, the observation that the critiques pointed

to the obligation concept is also true for the accrual
concept, which seems not to haye avoided the weaknesses of

the obligation method in terms of lack of precise definition
and various interpretations.

Effective Controls

The pros of the change to the accrual method argue

that the obligation method is not an effective instrument of
control.

This criticism was pointed out by the second Hoover

Commission in 1955.

Professors Anthony and Herzlinger went

even further by stating that "failure to use accrual account

ing is a fundamental weakness in some management control

systems; without it, other desirable control techniques are
6

not possible.

Robert N. Anthony and Regina E. Herzlinger, Mangement
Control in Nonprofit Organizations (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 340.
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This argument, howe ver, seems to have missed the
basic characteristic of the

federal budget and accounting

which essentially is geared towards controlling the expendi
tures of government.

The

President's Commission on Budget

Concepts emphasized, in it

report, that recording obligations

is essential for finaricial control and accountability of

agency appropriations and that appropriations will continue
to be the critical point o: congressional control over the
expenditure process.

Further, had the obligation concept

been useless in terms of controls, it would have been abandoned
with the advent of the accrual

system.

The fact is that the

obligation concept is stil , and will continue to be, opera
tive as an instrument of control and as an important point

in the life cycle of federa1 transactions.
Walter Held, there are at
7 ■

federal fiscal process.

According to

east six points of control in the
Chronologically, these points are

authorization, 'appropriation, obligations, accrued expendi
'>

,

^

ture, applied cost, and expenditure or disbursement point,
Following is a discussion

1.
bill

f each point:

The first point

of control is the authorization

whereby approval is granted to embark on an activity

or a program requiring future expenditures.

This is the

strongest point of control because of the possibility of
stopping the activity or program at this early stage.

Walter G. Held, S /stemic Improvement in the Federal
Budgetary Process, quoted in The Federal Expenditure Policy
for Economic Growth and Stability by the Joint Economic
Government Printing Office,
Committee (Washington, D.C
1957), pp. 455-76. \
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2.

The second point of control is the determination

of the level of spending or the ceiling.

This point is known

as the appropriatiph, where the dollar amount is approved.
3.

The thirdsp

legal obligations. ; T

of control is the recording of
is important since each agency has

to keep track of the ampunts of goods or services that have
been ordered so as to have a running record of how much

' ■. ■ ■

■h i

^^

.

spending authbrity has been used and how much is left.
4.

8 ■ ■ ■■■

The . fourth pPint of control arises, when ^the goods

and/or services are delivered.

The accrued expenditure is

recorded at this time, thus showing the liability of the
agency. ■

5.

sumption

takes
6.

point.

The fifth point of control is incurred when con

place.

This is known as applied cost.

The sixth point of control is the expenditure

This is the point at which actual payment is made.
According to Walter Held:

Obviously, the point of control which is most
effective is that which occurs nearest the

beginning of the process.

The resulting points

g

of control generally speaking are governed by it.
Additionally, it is hard to accept the view that

absence of accrual accounting is a fundamental weakness in a

.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
(Washington, D,C. : Government Printing Office, 1970) , p. 30.

Held, Systemic Improvement in the Federal Budgetary
Process, pp. 455-76.

management control system.

First, management control is not

a result of, neither is it a by-product of, the accrual
method. ^SecondlY, the existence and application of an accrual

method does not always mean that there is a strong management

control system.: Third, the American Institute of Certified
■ 10'

Fublic Accounts emphasized the authorization of transactions

as an important point of cohtrol, a notion upheld in the
federal fiscal process.

Very important is the statement that

"there are inherent limitations that should be recognized in

considering the potential effectivenss of any system of
accounting controls.

The American Institute of Certified

Public AccQuntants recites such limitations as those arising

from errors of misunderstanding, carelessness> or mistakes
of judgment.

Another example of the limits of any system

of control would be collusion in those instances where effec

tive controls are predicated on "segregation of duties.
The point here is that it takes more than the accrual
method to achieve and maintain an effective control system.

Also, there is no guarantee that the accrual method will
always be coupled with ah effective control system.

Behayioral Aspects

The second Hopyer Commission, in its report in 1955,

^^Tho American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Statements on Auditing Standards #1 (New York:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.,

1973), pp. 18-20.

'V

^^Ibid., p. 22. .

80

criticized the obligation basis of appropriations as an

incentive in the agencies to use all available obligational
authority (currently known as budget authority) because such

action tends to strengthen the agency budget requests in the
following year.

In fact, this is a behavioral problem which

is related to the overall system rather than to the obligation
method alone.

To attribute this problem to the obligation

method is an oversimplification.

The budget authority in one

year is used as a base for the following year's budget.
Accordingly, if not all the budget authority is used by the
agency, chances are that the savings will be allocated to

another agency.

This has been expressed by John^Cooley,when

he stated:

An important missing ingredient in federal systems
has been inability to allow managers to benefit from
efficiencies. . . .

As no ready measure of success and no easy way to
reward successful federal managers has been found,
the selfish advantage of a federal manager often is

served by keeping the budget high--by building
empires.

Speaking of this behavioral aspect, Thomas Anton
spcxe of the first budget rule:

Spend all of your appropriation and, if possible,
a little bit more.

Failure to use up an appropriation indicates that
the full amount was unnecessary in the first place,
which in turn implies that the Budgetary Commission
did not do its job. Such an implicit slap in the

^^John W. Cooley, "The Federal Accountant's Role ,in
Providing Organizational Incentives," The Federal Accountant
20 (December 1971):3-19.

^
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Commission's face is extremely dangerous and can

lead to a reduction in the next appropriation.13
The problem is then behavioral with some political
implications.

After an agency advocates its budget request,

it could be politically embarrassing for the agency itself
and to the appropriation committee as well if the approved
level of spending is not used up.
In the private sector, managers are rewarded through

a variety of financial incentives such as commissions, bonuses,
or salary increases, when they achieve their goals at less

than the budgeted or anticipated cost.

This constitutes a

motivating force to them, which is not available to their
counterparts in government. '

With the absence of personal financial incentives,
political incentive functions as a motivating force for gov
ernment managers.

This political incentive is best exemplified

in terms of high budget figures and higher levels of spending,
which together are a symbol of political power, prestige,
and high regard of the agency's mission.

^

This makes it clear that the overall federal system,

and not only the obligation basis of budgeting and account

ing which lacks alternative incentives, is responsible for the
behavior of federal managers to spend all, or even more than,

what has been appropriated to strengthen their budget requests.

13

Thomas J. Anton, "Agency Budget Roles," quoted in
Robert Golembiewski and Jack Rabin, Eds., Public Budgeting and

Finance, Readings in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Chicago;
F. E. Peacock Publishing, Inc., 1975), p. 207.

~
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It follows that the remedy lies not in changing the obliga
tion method to the accrual method, but rather it lies in the

search for alternative incentives, an endeavor that goes
beyond the realm of accrual accounting.

Further, accrual accounting measures the cost of

achieving the goals or the budget targets.

Included in this

cost figure is the cost of performance, which is simply the
labor cost.

Because the budget has an impact on the behavior

of employees and, consequently, on their performance, the
measurement of cost will include any inefficiencies that
occurred in the course of performance.

By using this cost

figure as a base for budget estimates, we are running the
risk of incorporating one year's inefficiencies into the
following year's budget.

The point here is that accrual

accounting is not free from behavioral implications exactly^
as the obligation method is not.
Recent research has proved the relation

budgets and human behavior.

between

This is equally true both in

the private and public sectors.

In affecting the human

behavior, it is affecting the human performance and, conse

quently, impacting efficiency and productivity.
Schiff and Lewin, on the basis of three case studies,

showed that managers actively participate in the budget
process and bargain for slack to insure attainment of goals,

to avoid consequences of failure in achieving higher goals,
and to achieve personal goals.

They maintain that ". . . to
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the firm this unexpected behavior results in lost opportuniV-:: ' ■
. "
'14 "'
ties and in,the long run increases its cost function."
The accrual method here will measure costs as incurred

includirig any ihefficiencies.

Since the budget serves as a

planning as well as a control tool, both authors stated that:
The dual role of budgets has many dysfunctional con
sequences and largely accounts for most of the
behavioral- studies on budgets. Dysfunctional
consequences occur because budgets can be used to

induce pressure and to impose goals on the organiza
tion participants.

The discussion just presented shows that behavioral

aspects in the budgetary process are equally applicable to
both private and government organizations and that the accrual

method does not provide a remedy in either type of organization,

Finally, when the accrual method becomes widely
implemented, it will not substitute the obligation basis,
but rather will constitute an additional step in the fiscal

cycle.

This may even foster the behavioral problems when cost

figures are exaggerated or manipulated, intentionally or
unintentionally, through individual judgment, errors, or
accounting changes.

Accurate Measurement of Cost

The proponents of accrual accounting maintain that

^■^Michael Schiff and Arie Y. Lewin, Behavioral Aspects
of Accounting (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey;
Inc., 1974) , p. 119.

y ^^Ibid., p. 118.

Prentice-Hall,

■
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the obligation method of accounting falls short in measuring

the cost of federal programs.

Und-er traditional practices

of budgeting and accounting, neither Congress nor the agency
management is aware of the cost of carrying out federal pro
grams.

In order to know the accurate cost, the accrual

method has to be adopted since it provides for an accurate
measurement of resources consumed as opposed to mere cash
outlays or obligations incurred.

In general, the accrual method of accounting better ^

reflects the costs of a specific function over a certain
period of time.

organizations.

This has been very true in private sector

That the accrual method would easily provide

accurate cost measurement in government is questionable.

First of all, intergovernmental fiscal relations

present a challenge to what the accrual method can accomplish
in terms of cost measurement.

Many federal programs are

delegated to State and local governments for implementation.
This takes the form of grants in aid, subsidies, and contri
butions.

Federal government reimburses these levels of

government for the costs they incur in the course of adminis
tering those programs.

Since the majority of State and local

governments adopt the cash, or at best, the modified accrual
basis, there is no way to ascertain that what the federal gov

ernment pays is representative of the true cost of any program.
Unless all states and local governments adopt the accrual

basis and follow the same cost accounting procedures
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consistently, there is no way to know the real cost of any
program.

Additionally, in many grant programs the federal gov

ernment may set a limit or a ceiling as to what may be reim
bursed to the State or local government.

Thus, the cost for

the federal government is the actual cash outlay paid which
does not necessarily agree with the true cost as arrived at
by the grantee departments administering the programs.
There is little, if anything at all, that the accrual method
can offer under these circumstances.

Further, in determining the cost of any program, the

federal government maintains a distinction between allowable

cost and unallowable cpst.^^ Allowable cost is reimburseable
while unallowable cost is not.

As State and local governments

submit their claims for reimbursement, they only reflect
allowable costs which are not the same as total or actual

costs.

If both allowable and unallowable costs constitute

the total cost of a program, what difference does it make to
adopt the accrual method if cost reports are based only on
the allowable costs?

It is clear that it will not make any

difference since the cost is not accurately measured.

^^U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
A Guide for State and Local Government Agencies, Cost Princi
ples and Procedures in Establishing Cost Allocation Plans
and Cost Rates for Grants and Contracts with the Federal

Government, OASC-10 (This document contains GSA Federal

Management Circular 74-4 formerly known as 0MB Circular A-87),
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
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There are several federal agencies whose obligations

are primarily geared towards payment of grants, subsidies,
and other programs administered by other levels of government.

For example, of an estimated obligation incurred of $54,836
million in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
in 1978, $47,863 million was estimated for grants, subsi
dies, and contributions.

Whether the entire amount or part

of it is liquidated before the end of the fiscal year, the
accrual method of accounting is insignificant because this
this will be the amount spent regardless of costs of the

programs administered by other government levels and because
17

the latter will report only the allowable costs.

According

to the General Accounting Office:
For some types of programs where cash advanced to
grantees by the federal government is kept closely
associated with the cash'needs of the grantees to pay
their bills, the difference between cash disbursements

by the federal government and accrued expenditures
for a given month, measured by the accrued costs and
expenses of the grantees, will not be great.
Unfortunately, few federal agency grantees as yet

keep their accounting records on the accrual basis.
Thus data for making a comparison between cash and
accrued expenditure data for specific periods are not
readily available.

Because of the inability to determine the true costs
of federal programs administered by State and local govern
ments, while a federal agency is liable for reimbursing
states or local governments for administering certain
programs, it becomes evident that the term "accrued costs"

^"^See Appendix D.
l^U.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government
(Washington, D .C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 30.
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is misleading and that the term "accrued expenditure" is more
relevant under the circumstances-.

Thus, at the end of the fis

cal year the unpaid balance to State and local governments
becomes a liability on the part of the federal agency when there

is evidence that those other levels of government have fulfilled
their obligation according to the terms of the programs.

Secondly, in some federal agencies a substantial
portion of expenditures is directed towards salaries, wages,
and related benefits, the obligation of which is liquidated
19

over a period not exceeding one month.

This is coupled with

the fact that accrued annual leave is an unfunded liability

until the time it is taken.

This,annual leave is recognized

as a cost only when it is taken rather than when it is earned.
Thus, cost of labor is distorted under such practices.
In addition, those agencies whose budgets consist
mostly of salaries and related employee benefits will not
have much difference between accrual accounting and cash

accounting.

According to the General Accounting Office,

"For a year, the difference would be relatively small, assum-'
ing no major increase or decrease in the volume of work
20

performed. . . ."

: Thirdly, to advocate the accrual method on the grounds
that it is more relevant to the concept and the trend

towards program budgeting, since it makes it possible to
measure the cost of federal programs, seems like putting the
cart before the horses.

There are problems in designing a

^^See Appendix E.
20u.S., General Accounting Office, Frequently Asked
Questions About Accrual Accounting in the Federal Government,
P•

•

program structure; there are programs that do not coincide
with the organizational structure of an agency; and there

are programs that cross organizational lines.
problems !arise from the fact that

Further

. . programs are

fictional, in the sense that they cannot be physically ,
'

.

21

identified in terms of organizational units."

These problems and complexities need to be solved,
and coordination heeds to be maintained among various divisions

within an agency and among various agencies.
then, can the accrual method be advocated.

Then, and only

The task of

tracing a program cost, which transcends organizational lines,
is horrehdous.

Unless the^agencies involved achieve the

utmost consistency in the accounting method and procedures

and cost accounting practices, the cost information will be
less than reliable.

Finally, cost figures do not tell much about effiqi
ency or effectiveness unless they are compared with a
standard—the cost of a similar activity--or evaluated in
terms of the benefits derivedi

Questions related to the

efficiency and effectiveness of government operations are
still far better than the answers.

The product of government

activities is intangible in nature and hard to measure in
terms of true actual costs.

The effectiveness is even more

difficult, if not impossible, to measure.

The uniqueness of

^^Robert D. Lee, Jr., and Ronald W. Johnson, Public
Budgeting Systems (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1975),
p. 267.

■ ■
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government programs makes it difficult to compare their costs

since they are not duplicated elsewhere.

With the govern

ment embarking on new programs and subprograms, uncertainty
surrounds cost estimates.

When a program is discontinued,

everyone seems to be at a loss regarding the meaning of the
cost figures.

efficient?

Was it high?

Was it low?

Was the program

When programs are continued from one year to

the next, we are left with the alternative of comparing
costs from one year to the next..

This involves the risk of

carrying and comparing the inefficiencies from one year to
the next, particularly when behavioral implications, as
explained earlier, are introduced in the budget process.

To evaluate the effectiveness of government programs
requires first ah identification of what goals are sought
to be achieved and then a measurement of what was actually

achieved against what was intended and at what cost.

Aside from the fact that a precise definition of

intended objective of certain programs is a very difficult
task because of the high levels of abstraction dealt with,
evaluation and assessment of program objectives are surrounded
with insoluble problems.

The program may impact more than one area in society.
It may achieve its goals only after long periods of time.

It

may benefit other areas than were originally intended, and it
may answer to a moral standard cherished by the people.

try to evaluate the program under such circumstances, in

To

,
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terms of cost-benefit analysis, is really ah attempt to
measure the immeasurable.

Better Information for pecision Making
Advocates of the accrual method maintain that by

adopting the accrual method better information can be pro

duced in regard to costs, revenues, assets, and liabilities
of federal agencies and various federal programs.

The

information, then, can be used in the decision-making

process.

They also argue that better information through

accrual accounting leads to better decisions in terms of
efficient utilization of resources, cost controls, and plan

ning for the future operations.

This argument should be broken down to its elements.

On the question of oasts, it has already been demonstrated
that under the pattern of ihtergovernmental relations in
terms of grants, subsidies, and contributions, the accrual
method falls short in achieving an accurate measurement of
costs.

In those instances where the majority of an agency's

expenditures is in the form of grants, the difference between
cash and the accrual basis is not going to be significant

and, consequently, the effort spent in installing and main
taining the accrual method is not worthwhile.

Where a

federal agency's expenditures are primarily spent for
salaries and wages and related employee benefits, the annual
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difference between the cash and accrual basis is not signifi

cant; hence, it is not justifiable.

In all those instances,

the cost of establishing and maintaining the accrual system

is not justifiable in terms of the information produced.

A

glance at the federal agencies will reveal that the majority
falls in either category-:-large grant programs category or

large spending, in proportion to total spending on salaries,
wages, and employee benefits category.

A few additional

comments will be further analyzed.
Several items of federal costs are uncontrollable.

These costs are known in advance and are usually determined

by statutes and laws.

Aside from the fact that transfer

payments which are made out' of trust funds constitute over
30 percent of total budget expenditure, there are within the
general fund several kinds of uncontrollable costs.

Accord

ing to Weidehbaum:
In addition to the trust funds, there are numerous

permanent appropriations which are contained in
budget funds. The largest of these is the permanent
and indefinite appropriations for the payment of
interest on the national debt. . .

22jy[urray L. Weidenbaum, "Budget 'Uncontrollability'
as an Obstacle to Improving the Allocation of Government
Resources," quoted in Robert T. Golembiewski and Jack Rabin,

Public Budgeting and Finance Readings in Theory and Practice,
2nd ed . (Itasca, Illinois: F. E. Peacock Publ., Inc., 1975),
p. 30. See Appendix F, which shows the actual and estimated
interest paid from 1976 to 1978 in relation to the total
outlays in billions of dollars.
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In addition to the interest payment, other uncon

trollable costs include the partially completed programs
and fixed charges, other than interest, such as public

assistance programs and veteran compensation and pension

payments/

Certain costs may also be incurred under certain

national emergencies or where there is an international
crisis that requires the federal government to act in one
way or another.

Where costs are relatively known and determined in

advance and where they are somewhat uncontrollable, there is
little that accrued accounting can offer.

In situations

of emergency, cost information is not significant

since the primary objective is to remedy the situation as'
soon as possible regardless of the cost involved.
: Another related problem is the confusion about the

real objective of the accrual method.

The President's

Commission on Budget Concepts emphasized the expenditure
accrual as a valid measurement of economic impact of
federal operations.

Morse maintained that:

The primary reason for urging adoption of the
accrual basis for reporting expenditures was to
obtain a better periodic measure of the economic
impact of federal expenditures than is produced

by any of the three budgets now in use.^
The Commission dealt with the question of cost as

if it were a by-product or of secondary importance to the

^^Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr., "Reporting Budget Expendi
tures on the Accrual Basis
(December 1967):19-33.

The_J^^eraT_Acco^

16

93

accrued expenditure as it stated in part:

"The accrual

concept for budget purposes will■foster the concept of
cost control in all agencies.

As mentioned earlier,

some intellectuals criticized the concept of accrued

expenditure and felt that it was inadequate as compared to
accrued costs.

At any rate, when federal agencies accrue expendi
tures, they feel that they are complying with a major
recommendation.

On the question of revenue, theoretically and prac- .
tically, an agency's revenue is simply what is allocated to

it through the budgetary process which, in turn, is a
political process~as demonstrated earlier.

1

The revenue

generated is not a result of performing the activities or
providing services in government.
reverse is exactly true.

As a matter of fact, the

The revenue is allocated first,

based on national priorities; and then services are provided

and expenditures are incurred within the limitation of this
allocation.

Further, there are difficulties in accruing

revenue .according to the President's Commission on Budget
Concepts, which stated in part:
The Commission recognizes that the problems are
somewhat greater in implementing its accrual recom
mendation in the case of receipts than for expendi
tures. . . . The Federal government currently has no
accounting system from which accurate measures of

^'^Report of the President's Commission on Budget
Cone epts, p. 41.
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the accrued tax liabilities of the private sector
may be extracted. At present, the Treasury only has
: this information when tax returns are compiled and
tax payments are actually made by the taxpayer.

The doramission recognizes that this problem makes
it impossible to irapiement, at this time, accruing all
tax revenues. The estimation problems of tax accrual
are greatest for the individual income and employment
. taxes-.

Individual income (and employment) taxes . . .

cannot easily be placed fully on an accrual basis.
It would be difficult to estimate precisely at earlier

dates the aggregate tax liability for all of the more
than 60,000,000 individuals who file their final
returns at a later date. The Commission, however,
recommended accruing corporate income taxes basically
because "Legislation requiring more current reporting
and payment of estimated taxes has substantially
reduced time lags between accrual of corporation tax
liabilities and the payment of corporation income
taxes. Nevertheless these time lags can still be ,
quite significant. . . .
Thus, the accrual method of accounting falls short

of measuring accurate revenue figures because of the incapa
bility of accruing a substantial portion of receipts that
account for, let alone individual income tax, approximately
40 percent of total receipts.

Taken together, hoth revenues and costs in accrual

accounting will suffer another failure; namely, the matching
principle which in itself is a major premise upon which the

accrual method is predicated.

Since government activities

and services are not, by their very nature, revenue producing
and since the government can function under deficit, surplus
or a balanced budget, there tends to be no relation between

^^Ibid., pp. 43-45.

■ il .
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its revenues and its costs.|; Hence, matching revenues and
expenses cannot be achieved.;
On the question of icssetSj, both accrual, and cash ,

methods of accounting dictaiie that tangible assets are
recorded at cost.

Here, the; cost under both methods is the

actual price paid to acquir^ the asset.
.

■

■•

,

■ ■ i' , ' ■

'

Currently, information
,

•

on funds obligated for the piurchase of assets by the federal

government is available thrqiugh the "object class analysis"

since assets are charged to ||a specific account code.
Additionally, the special-ari:alysis of the federal budget gives
detailed information on, and a distinction between, invest

ment, operating, and other b'udget outlays.

Another analysis

provides for federal public jiworks activities.
Further, it is diffiibult if not impossible to measure
some assets of the federal ^bvernment, not only because they
. .

■

j| .

^

..

.;

.

■

■

are intangible but sometimesj when they are tangible also.
In these instances, the acctiial method is no better than

the cash basis. According t|b the Advisory Committee on
Federal Consolidated Financilbl Statements:
. . - . certain intangible and unmeasurable attributes
exist with respect to the federal government. For
example, the taxing power of a government is an asset.
It is difficult, however, to place a value on this
attribute. Similarly, the federal government owns
various properties such as the Washington Monument,
the Lincoln I^bmorial, etc., that have no ready market
value. . . .

The business concept of an asset breaks down in
unexpected ways when applied to the federal government.
Some of the nation's most cherished assets provide
hone of the usefulness of business assets. They
cannot be converted to other forms, used to produce
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revenues or applied against debts.

Indeed, commit

ments to maintain certain assets such as monuments

and historic sites represent: cohtinuing obligations
more in the nature of iiabilities.
The financial condition of the federal govern
ment depends primarily on an "asset" that cannot be
booked in any meaningful way. . . .
.

On , the ^question of liabilities, TierneY. SLud. Hoffman
maintained that: ,

generally, there is no significant difference between
the obligation, accrued expenditure, costs and checks
issued when the transaction is incurred and settled

immediately. For example, the time difference
between incurring an obligation for employee salaries
and benefits and paying this obligation could be
relatively short and be of little consequence in any
agency's accounting or reporting.

The same view was expressed by the President's Commission
on Budget Concepts in 1967, except that it mentioned the
occasional "humps" that result from the biweekly structure
of the federal government.

As there are problems in measuring assets, there
are also problems in measuring liability.

The federal gov

ernment is under moral obligations to continue certain

programs and to create others to meet both national and
international goals.

To attempt to place a dollar value on

such commitments under the accrual method is going to be
far from accurate.
and

Thus, information will be both meaningless

useless.

.S., The Advisory Committee on Federal Consolidated
Financial Statements, Recommendations to the Secretary Of

the Treasury (Washington, B.C.:
1976), pp. 11-30. v.-

Government Printing Office,

^

^"^Tierney and Hoffman, pp. 90-91.

Further, the government has the power to discontinue

certain programs and relinquish its obligation in specific
areas.

It becoimds misleading then, to say at one point of

time, the government is liable to pay a certain amount to
meet its obligations since at any point of time the govern
ment can reduce or even conceal its liabilities.

On the question of hettev decision making as a
result of the better information generated through accrual

accounting, it was demonstrated that accrual accounting is

not going to produce such "better information" in many situa
tions.

Also, this argument implies that programs will be

decided upon in light of this improved information.

This is

really far from the truth because national priorities are
determined throughout the budgetary process and, accordingly,

programs are executed.

Stated differently, accounting

information is not the decisive factor for decisions related

to programs; but the determination of national priorities,
which is strictly a political process, is the key element in
making decisions related to programs.

Another implication of this argument is that govern
ment decisions are based solely on economic rationality
where the best alternative, and consequently the best

decision, is selected in terms of costs and benefits or is
selected where it yields a higher return on investment if

compared with other alaternatives.

In government, economic

rationality is easily said than exercised in practice.

■

; ■:

; :'v

■ ,

In addition tp the problems ;of calculating true hnd accurate
costs, benefits are difficult to measure; and in choosing

among programs there is no way to say, for example, that
the dollar spent on national defense yields a higher return
to investment than the dollar spent on a health program.

Economic rationality in government is extremely hampered by

the intangible and imnieasurable goals and benefits which are
sought by the government.

Within the political environment'

of government, political rationality and political costs and

benefits are supreme to economic rationality and economic
costs and benefits.

According to Diesing:

Political rationality is the fundamental kind
of reason because it deals with the preservation

and improvement of decision structures, and decision
structures are the source of all decisions.

The

political problem is always basic and prior to the
others. This means that any suggested course of
action must be evaluated first by its effects on

the political structure.

A course of action which

corrects economic or social deficiencies but

increases political difficulties must be rejected,
while an action which contributes to political

improvement is desirable even if it is not entirely
sound from an economic or social standpoint.

On political costs and benefits, Wildavsky maintained
that "in a political situation, the need for support assumes

central importance.

Not simply the economic, but the

political costs and benefits turn out to be crucial."

2^Paul Diesing, "Reason in Society," quoted in Aaron
Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency; Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Systems Analysis and Program Budgeting," Public
Administration Review 26 (December 1966):292-307.

^^Ibid., p. 307.
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When leaders promote certain programs or try to get a policy
adopted, they will need the support of the power base (i.e.,

interest groups. Congress members, and electorate).

Since iio

one measure can satisfy everyone, certain costs are going to
be incurred, and which take the form of opposition and hos

tility on the part of other interest groups, Congress members,

and electorate.

For the politician, the cost is too high

when he loses the election.

Under political rationality, it

is very important to maintain a balance; and it is very

important to compromise since a 100 percent political benefit
(support) is difficult, and political costs (opposition and

losing election) are too high for a politician to stand.
Diesing best illustrated this by stating;
. . . Non-political decisions are reached by con
sidering a problem in its own terms, and by evaluat

ing proposals according to how well they solve the
problem. The best available proposal should be
accepted regardless of who makes it or who opposes
it, or a faulty proposal should be rejected or

improved no matter who makes it. Compromise is
always irrational; the rational procedure is to
determine which proposal is the best, and to accept
it. In a political decision, on the other hand,
action never is based on the merits of a proposal
but always on who makes it and who opposes it.
Action should be designed to avoid complete identi
fication with any proposal and any point of view,
no matter how good or how popular it might be. The
best available proposal should never be accepted just
because it is best; it should be deferred, objected
to, discussed, until major opposition disappears.
Compromise is always a rational procedure, even when

the compromise is between a good and a bad proposal.

^^Ibid.

■ ■■
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No matter^then^how good the accrual accounting

information, it: is less likely that a decision will be based
on it.

ComprQihise, or political rationality, is the pattern

as well as the rule of making decisions in government.

As a

result of compromise, the political apparatus functions well,
conflict is reduced among political rivals, and political
costs are reduced while political benefits are increased.

This, in turn, provides a healthy political structure within
the frame of Which other decisions are made.

Further, to say that accrual accounting is important

for the decision making in government seems more theoretical

than practicali

The decision-making process in government

is dispersed due to the division of powers and the principle
of checks and balances among the three branches of government.
There.is no one single entity that has the ultimate power to
make decisions over the various issues.

Information has to

be presented to those who participate in the decision-making

process.

It becomes inevitable that various interests will

be introduced; different interpretation as to what the

figures mean will, be provided; and discussions, arguments,
and debates will take place.

The end result will be a

decision which consaders various interests and viewpoints
(i.e., a compromise).

As a matter of fact, the pattern of decision-making

process in government is a manifestation of power relation
ships within a frame of political power structure.

It is not

■■
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likely that accrual information will change that pattern of
decisioh makingv;

This is because the change in the pattern

of decision making requires first a change in power relation
ships which, in turn, entails an alteration of the present
power structure.

' :

In addition, it is a well known principle in govern

ment that legal cpmp'liance has a priority over accounting

principle.

Federal agencies have to comply with the statutes

and the laws governing their operations even when they contra
dict with accpUnting principles.

This, of course, has an

impact pn producing reliable accounting information in the

professionar sehse.

Whether this principle of legal com

pliance is good pr bad is iimaterial.

What is important is

that it is a: reality that should be recognized.
■

Finally, many decisions in government are based on

qualitative information which are not related at all to
accounting or any other quantitative information.

For

example, the national defense budget could be determined
on the basis of reports and information on the Soviet

military power.

Foreign aid programs could be determined

in light of international relations considerations.
In summary, the information derived from the accrual

accounting cannot be regarded as a major source of informa
tion which provides the basis of decision making in
government.

The political nature of government has a

tendency to place accounting information at a lower level

^

V\„
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of importance than that enjoyed in the private sector organi
■zationsi' . ,

'h;i

/

Experience of the Private Sector Organizations
;

Advocates of the accrual method in government main

tain that on the basis of the excellent record of accrual

accounting in the private sector organizations, government
organizations should adopt it in order to obtain better
information which, in turn, I will lead to better decisions.
This, in turn, will: make go^iernment more efficient and as
effective as private organizations.

Perhaps the easiest argument against this view is
its failure to recognize the differences between the political
environment of government organizations as compared with the
economic erivironitient:of priyate organizations.

While there

is a high degfee of dependence between government and busi

ness, the fact that they are different from each other should
not be overlooked.

As stated earlier, they aire different in

terms of goals,, environment, operation, and decision making.

Another argument is that, from a systems standpoint,
what seems beneficial a:nd fruitful to one organization will

not necessarily be beneficial and fruitful for another
organization.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The federal government is a complex political organi
zation which lies at the heart of the political structure

and seeks the achievement of a multitude of complex, comple

mentary, and siorrietimes conflicting, intangible goals.

No

one single word or phrase can best describe what government

is all about or what its objectives are.

The objectives are

dynamic and immeasurable and usually cross national borders.
There are difficulties in measuring the cost of its programs.
The benefits derived out of these programs do not lend them
selves to measurement.

There is no correlation between the

volume or nature of its activities and the revenue generated

through taxes.

The former is determined on political grounds

which coincide with the needs and goals of the nation as a

whole, rather than being based on cost.

This is best exempli

fied in the ability, and sometimes even as an intended goal,

of the government to operate under a deficit or surplus
budget.

The dacision-making process is incremental, frag

mented throughdut the political power structure, and is
characterized with political rationality rather than being
influenced with economic rationality and quantitative data.
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Political decision itiaking in government is the net

product of political support, debate, argument, and negotia
tion.

Political costs and benefits, which are not amenable

to measurement/ are weighed carefully and become key variables
in the decision-making process.

These represent crucial

points of departure from the private sector organizations
whose goals can be summed up in one word—profit.

goal is easily?measurable.

Such a

Matching their revenues with

their costs is quite possible.

Their decision-making process

is based primarily on economic rationality.

Their existence

is justified only to the extent of their ability to make a

profit.

They cannot function under deficit (loss) conditions.
The political environment and the political decision-

making process?in government place colossal limitations on

what accrual abcounting can offer.

Neither will it help in

matching revenues and expenses, nor will it achieve accurate
cost measurerrient under present political structure and inter

governmental relations. ' In other instances, where salaries,
wages, and employee benefits constitute the majority of an

agency's expense, it is not even worth adopting.

Most

importantly, it is not going to change the political pattern

of decision making in government.

In cases of national or

international emergencies, accrual accounting information

is goin.g to be absolutely irrelevant and will not even be
considered.

Zealot advocates for the accrual method in government.

105

who seem to have oversold their case, must be aware of such

limitations.

AS Professor Wildavsky:eminently and realis

tically put it:

"In social research (indeed, more in social

action), it is as important to know what can't be done as
what can. . . .

The fact that accrual accounting is widely accepted

and is extremely successful in the private sector, in
addition to being a cherished accounting method by profes
sional accountants, is not enough to justify its adoption

in government where there are severe limitations which make
its usefulness questionable.

Accrual accounting is economically oriented and is

a powerful tooi in the economic decision-making process.

Yet,

when decisions are not basically economic, but rather are

primarily political, accrual accounting tends to lose much of
its power as a: tool iu the ^ecision-making process.

Hence,

its usefulness is limited and its adoption becomes questionable,
This is precisely the case with the accrual method of account
ing in government.

Its record in the federal government speaks for

itself.

After,thirty years, it is only sporadically adopted

and there is little assurance, if any at all, that it has

produced significant results where applied.
^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary
Process, 2nd ed (Boston:
1974), p. x. ■

;■ ■

Little, Brown & Company , Inc.,
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,In short, the political realm of government is far
beyond the reach of accrual accounting which has never been
geared towards solving political problems.

This is not to

build a case against accrual accounting, but this is simply

to say that it is not compatible with, nor is it useful for,
the general fund operations of the federal government.

Accrual accounting and political decisions are not compatible,
As a matter of fact, the recognition of the modified
accrual basis as an acceptable accounting practice

is

by

implication a recognition that full accrual, as practiced in
the private sector, is not compatible with government opera
tions.

APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A

.

BUD®T RECEIMS, OUTLAYS, AND DEBT, 1970-79 (in billions of dollars)

Actual
19701

1971-

1972 if :1973

1974

161.4

181.2

..

■ 1975>:

Estimate
1976

.;,TQ.

1977; -

1973

:;,1979

12

Receipts & Outlays:'
Receipts:

143.2
59.4
-8.8

Federal funds
Trust funds :

Interfund trans.

,■

Total budget
receipts

133.8
66.2

148.8
'73.0

-11.6 - -13,2;

104.8
92.2
-21.3 ;,^21.1

187.5

200.3

54 .0

240.;4

267.9
168,5

188.0

-36.0

-37,5

289.1

118.6

133.7

32.1

152.8

-25.1

-34.8

-4.4

-56.3

281.0"

299:2" 81;7 A356v9:':^100.4"" -439.6

^
193.T

V188.4

208.6

232.2

"l64.9

156.3

178.1

187.0

199.9

240.0

269.1
131.3
-34.8

65.0
34.0

143.3

-4.4

365.6

94.7

H-'
o
00

Outlays: .
Federal funds

Trust funds
Interfund trans.

Total budget
outlays

49.1

•163.7
59.4

-8.8

-11.6

67.1
-13.2

-21.3

90.8
-21.1

111.2
-25.1

196.6

211.4

232.0

247.1

269.6

326.1

81.4

294.9,
-36,3

-37.5

401.9 .

462.2 ^

500.2

Outlays, off-budget

Federal entities

^

(...)

(...)

(...)

(.1)

(1.4)

(8.1)

(7.2) (1.8)

363.6

340.0
158.2
-36.0

174.1

r-v

(8.7) ( . ) ( • )

Outlays including

2tiS£^^

(196.6) (211.4) (232.0) (247.1) ;(271.1) (334.1) (372.9) (96.4) (410.6) (473.7) (512.7)

Surplus or deficit(-):

Federal funds
Trust funds

r

-29.9
6.8

-29.3
5.9

-25.6
10.7

-18.7
14.0

-52.5
7.4

-68.9 -11.0
2.4
2.0

-54.
9.5

•
10.3
v--, o

rt\ n

- 2.8

-23vQ

-23.4

-14.8

- 4.7

-45.1

-66.4 -13.0

-45.0

-61.8

-60.6

Total surplus or

deficit (-)

_

-13.1
10.3

*(,
13.9

APPENDIX A—Continued

Actual
1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

(-8.1)

(-7.2)

. P
IQ

:
1977

Estimate
1978

1979

Surplus or deficit {-),
off-budget Federal

entities

(-.1) (-1.4)

(-1,8) (-8.7) (-11.5) (-12,5)

• Surplus or deficit (-),
inclijding off-budget

Federal entities

( -2.8) (-23.0) (-23.4) (-14.9) (-6.1) (-53,1) (-73.7) (-14,7)(-53.7) (-73.4) (-73.1)

Outstanding debt/
end of year
Gross Federal debt

' Held by;
Gov. agencies
The public

382.6

409.5

437.3

468.4

486.2

544.1

631.9

646.4

709.1 . 785.6

873.7

97.7

105.1

125.4

140.2

147.2

151.6

148.1

182.8

304.3

343.0

346.1

396.9

480.3

498.3

157.3
551.8

167.7

284.9

113.6
323.8

617.8

690.8

57.7
227.2

65.5

71.4

75.2

80.6

85.0

105.0

NA

252.3

267.9

265.4

311.9

94.7
385.6

96.7

238.8

; 401.6

446.8

na:

Federal reserve

system
; Others .

:

NA

NA

NA - Not available.

^The amounts of earned incone credit in excess of tax liabilities are shown as negative budget receipts

rather than as budget outlays. Accordingly, the budget totals have been adjusted retroactively.

^The 1975-77 data have been revised retroactively to include the housing for the elderly or handicapped
fund in the unified budget instead of with the off-budget Federal entities.

SOURCE: U.S., The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, B.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 73.
■
'
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M>PE1SDIX B

TIMING Of THE RECORDING OF PURCHASE OF MATERIALS
tiNDER ACCRUAL METHOD OF ACCOUNTING

Recorded in Accounting Records in Month

in Which

; ^

Materials
Order

Transaction

is placed

:

are

delivered

Materials
are used

Bill

is paid

Placing an
order for

,, As an

materials

obligation
Materials
delivered

.

As an

accrued

expenditure
Materials used
As an

or consumed

applied
cost

Payment made .
As a

for materials

disbursement
of cash

SOURCE: U.Si, General Accounting Office/ Frequently Asked Questions
About Accrual Accpunting in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C,:
Govemraent Printing Office, 1970), p. 5.

110

APPENDIX C

ACTUAL AND ESTIMAIED COSTS FOR SELECTED PROGRAMS WITHIN

SELECTED DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMEaSlT

(Program and Financing on thousands of dollars)

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Departmental Administration
Identification Code



12-0120-0-1-352

1977 actiaal

Program by activities:
Direct program:^
1. Budget, planning
and evaluation .1 . . ,
2. Operations and
finance . . . . . . . .
3. Personnel . . . . . . .
4. Equal opportunity . . .

1978 est.

1979 est.

p
2,754

2,892

2,925

3,253
2,245
1,937

2,918
2,298
1,551

2,951
2,343
1,553

3,526

5,406

6,928

13,715

15,065

16,700

and evaluation . . . . .

7

7

7

2. Operations and
finance . ... . . . . .

5. Governmental and

public affairs . . . . .
Total direct

program . . . . . . .

Reimbursable program:
1. Budget, planning

;

.

1,947

1,191

1,191

3. Personnel . . . . . . .
4. Governmental and

788

826

826

public affairs . . . . .

858

489

489

3,600

2,513

2,513

17,314

17,578

19,213

Total reimbursable

.

program . . . . . . .
Total program costs,

fundedl . . . . . .
Change in selected resources
(undelivered orders) . . . .

'

.... ■

89

Total obligations . . .
Financing:
Offsetting collections from:

17,403

17,578

19,213

Federal funds . . . . . . .

-3,588

-2,513

-2,513

Non-federal sources . . . .

-

Unobligated balance
lapsing . . . . . . . . . .
Budget authority . . .

12

1,006
14,809

...

15,065

16,700

^Includes capital investment as follows: 1977, $132 thousand;
1978, $70 thousand; 1979, $70 thousand.
Ill
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APPENDIX C---Gontinued

DEPAKTMENT OF ENEPGY

Departmental Operations
Identifieation Code

89-0201-0-^1-053

1978 est.

1979 est.

75,879

96,300

92,800

development
.....
3. Weapons activities . . .,
4. Intelligence and

205,086
946,363

223,692

241,100

1,079,575

1,195,594

arms con-trol . . . . . .

18,756

23,325

27,400

5. Special materials
production . . . . . . .

349,964

400,744

476,400

23,421

. 33,578

35,089

.. . . .

1,619,469

1,857,214

2,068,383

resources (undelivered
orders) ' .... . . . .■ . . .

85,189

87,335

91,700

Total operating
obligations . . . . .

1,704,658

1,944,549

2 ,160,083

23,534

25,893

29,200

34,142
149,600

28,075
191,314

21,000
191,050

103,942

202,146

223,200

1977 actual

Program by activities:
Direct program bperating
costs, funded:
1. Inertial confinement
fusion . ,.. . . . . . .
2. Naval reactor

6. Nuclear materials

. security and
safeguards . . . . . . .
Total operating
costs, funded

Change in selected

Capital investment, funded:
1. Inertial confinemoiit

;:

:fusion

t .■ .

..

2. Naval -reactor

development . . . . . , . .
3. Weapon activities . . .
5. Special materials
production
6. Nuclear niaterials

security and
safeguards . . . ' . . .: .

3,123

3,000

316,311

450,551

467,450

(undelivered orders) . . . .

104,286

129,728

46,750

Total capital invest
ment, obligations . .

420,597

580,279

514,200

2 ,125,255

2 ,524,828

2 ,674,283

5,093

.

Total capital investment
funded

. . -

Change in selected resources

Total, direct
program

. . . . . . .
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APPENDIX C—Continued

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (Continued)

Identification Code
1978 est.

1979 est.

194,891

194,601

287,400

37,761

40,104

47,800

..

43,158

37,450

39,100

.. . ...

60,190

24,881

79,500

336,000

297,036

453,800

1977 actual

89-0201-0-1-053

Reimbursable program:
1. Naval reactor

development . . . . . .
2. Weapons activities:
a. National securitymanufacture of

weapons parts of
assemblies for
DOD

... . . . . .

b. Weapons testing
support for DOD

c. Weapons research
and development
for DOD

Total reimbursable

program costs . . . .
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APPENDIX C—-Continued

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

= Food and Drug Administration
Identification Code

73-060Q-0-1-554

1977 actual

1978 est,

1979 est.

Program by activities:
Direct program;
1. Foods . . . . . . . . .

79,396

87,718

85,188

2. Drugs & Devices . . . .
3. Radiological Prod . , .

98,614
18,099

128,285
20,262

135,290
20,489

12,947
32,460

13,866
38,579

13,974
39,363

241,516
1,582

288,710
3,000

294,304
3,000

243,098

291,710

297,304

4. National Center for

Toxicological Res . . .
5. Program management . .
Total direct

program . . . . . . .
Reimbursable program . . . .
Total program costs,

funded^ . . . . . . .
Change in selected resources
(undelivered orders) . . .

8,248

...

•••

Total obligations . .

251,526

291,710

297,304

-1,582

-3,000

-3,000

Financing:
;
Offsetting collections

from Federal funds . . . .
Unobligated balance

lapsing . ., .i:. . . . . .

75

Budget authority . . .

250,019

288,710

294,304

250,019

276,243

294,304

Budget authority:

Appropriation

.

Transferred to other

accounts . , . . . . . . .

...

-23

♦••

Appropriation

(adjusted) . . . . . . .
Supplemental now
requested for wageboard
. pay raises . . . . . . . .
Supplemental now
requested for civilian

pay raises . . , . . . . .

250,019
.i.

276,220
248

....

11,394

...

848

Supplemental now

requested for military

pay raises . ., . . . . . .

294,304
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (Continued)

Identification Code
73-0600-0-1-554

Relation of obligations
to outlays:
Obligations incurred, net . .
Obligated balance, start
of year
Obligated balance, end of
year . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adjustments in
expired accounts . . . . . .
Outlays, exluding
pay raise supplemental. .
Outlays from wageboard
pay raise
supplemental . . . . . .
Outlays from civilian

pay raise supplemental. .
Outlays from military
pay raise supplemental. .

Note:

1977 Actual

1978 est.

1979 est.

249,943

288,710

294,304

51,930

56,358

63,734

-56,358

-63,734

-65,074

- 3,998

241,517

...

269,094

292,714

...

243

5

...

11,149

245

...

848

...

Exludes $1,440 thousand in 1979 transferred to "General

departmental management." Comparable amomts for 1978 ($1,440 thousand)
and 1977 ($1,440 thousand) are included above.

^IncliJdes capital investment as follows: 1977, $10 thousand;
1978, $7 thousand; 1979, $8 thousand.

SOURCE: U.S., Appendix to the Budget, Fiscal
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

Year 1979 (Washington,

.

APPENDIX D

PER(3M[AGE OF FUNDS OBLIGATED FOR GRANTS, SUBSIDIES,. AND, GONTRIBUTIONS
TO TOTAL.OBLIGATIONS FOR SELECTED AGENCIES •
(in millions of dollars)

1975 Actual
Tl.Obl.
Inc.

1977 Estimated

. Grt.Sub.s
Contr.

Tl.Obl.
Q.
"O

19,78 Estimated

Grt.Sub.&

Inc.

Contr.

Tl.Obl.
Q.
"o ■

Grt.Sub.&

Inc.

■

Contr.

. o.

Department of

Acjriculture

.Department of
Gorrrnerce ,' -

CTl

24898

.'.

■

9409

38.0

1230 V:'.." ^ ■

49.0

30088

7

9640

9348

31.0

: 26671

2949

65.0

2418

,45453'7

84.0

54836 V , 47863

V

36.0

■■ /

;2493

4521 '

.

815 ' :

34.0

Department of
HEW.

42229

35720

85,0

54096

87.0

Department of

Housing and
Urban Develop.

39719

29716 :

75.0

33899

26457

78.0

33829

28545

17087

7435

44.0

13777

7258

53.0

10183

5867

58.0

4999

4522

90.0

7423

6361

86.0

6155

1443

23.0

. V

84.0

Department of
Labor

Environmental

Prot. Agency

Tl.Obi.Inc. - Total Obligations Incurred.
Grt.Sub.& Contr. - Grants,Subsidies and Contributions.

SOURCE: U.S., Office of Management, and Budget, Object Class Analysis—Budget for Fiscal Year 1978

:
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APPENDIX E

PERCENTAGE .OF FUNDS OBLIGATED -FOR PERSONNEL SERVICES
TO TOTAL OBLIGATIONS

(in millions of dollars)

1977 EstiiiHtod

1976 Actual

; ,. . 1

:^

^

TOTAL

TER.SEK,.&:

y.

.

TOTAL.
3

BENEFITS'

Executive Office of the

■X'f

"o

y ;aEL. ty

.PER.SER.& ■-/L

PER.SER.&

. . TOTAL

yBENEFlTS

OBL.

BEInEFITS

g.
"o

President

.y 42:.y;0--. ' . :y

Department of E)efpise lEElitary)

127900

Q,

1978 Estimate

y :/48:'

63.0 y

:;

. - yy \ :

.y ^ '/L

^

33.0

■ y.

65.0

' 1

160660 ;

36.0

147842

48668

753

22.0

4026

839

20.0

. 4274

1294

32.0

5498

1461

27.0

5549

45893

48

74

.49397; ,

31.0

.875

21.0

1533

28.0

Department of Defense (Civil)

3434

,,

y

Department of, Interior

y'3995 ;

,

APPENDIX E-—Continued

1976 Actual
TOTAL

OBL, .

1977 Estiinated

PER.SEP.&

BENEFITS

TOTAL
Q,

1978 Estimated

PER.SEP.&

TOTAL
Q.
"O

PER.SER.&
a
"o

OBL.

BENEFITS

45.0

2496

1144

46.0

2496

1188

. 48.0

37.0

8272

2280

28.0.

8206

2356

29.0

"O

OBL.

BENEFITS

Department of Justice

2290

1034

Department of Transportation

5484

2044

TOTAL OBL. - Total Obligations.
PER.SER.&BENEFITS - Personnel Services and Benefits.

SOUPGE: U.S., Office of Management and Budget, Object Class Analysis—^Budget for Fiscal Year 1978
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
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APPENDIX F

SCHEDULE OF UNCONTROLLABLE INTEREST EXPELSISE

(In billions of dollars)
Actual

Estimated

1976

1977

1978

34.6

38.0

39.7

Total Budget Outlay

366.5

411.2

440.0

Trust Fund Outlay

131.3

143.3

158.2

235.2

267.9

291.8

14.7

14.2

13.6

Interest Outlay

Total Outlays Excluding
Trust Funds

% of Interest Outlay to
Total Outlay (Excluding
Trust Funds)

SOURCES: U.S., Office of Management and Budget, The Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1978).
U.S., The United States Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1979
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
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